Book
Review: Lee Kuan Yew: A Single Man's Impact on Building a
Nation
Jin CHEN
Perspectives,
Vol. 3, No. 2
The
Singapore Story, Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Volume 1, Singapore
Press Holdings and the Times Publishing Group, 1998, 680 pages,
and From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000,
Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Volume 2, Singapore Press Holdings
and the Times Publishing Group, 2000, 778 pages.
Introduction
With
a population of 3.89 million living on a small island of 640
square kilometers, about 3.5 times of the size of Washington
DC, Singapore is one of the richest countries in the world.
Its GNP per capita, $29,610, ranked the 9th highest in 1999,
according to World Development Report (2000/2001) of the World
Bank, immediately after the US, surpassing many developed
countries including Germany, United Kingdom, France, Austria,
Canada, and Belgium. First-time visitors will notice that
Singapore is as clean and pretty as Geneva, Switzerland, and
as commercial and glamorous as Manhattan, New York. Orchid
Road is a highlight of the city's commercial activities. Like
Fifth Avenue in New York, it has numerous fashion shops of
world famous brands, conspicuously displaying their latest
designs behind huge windows. There is another city underground
- two more floors of shopping malls and dining facilities.
The frequent, round-city subway is down even further in the
third and the lowest level. One can hardly take the subway
without being lured to the shopping malls.
Singapore
is a country that perfectly combines modernity with some authentic
Chinese characteristics. Unlike Fifth Avenue, some high-end
department stores would distinctively decorate for Chinese
New Year Festival using Chinese traditional red ribbons and
paper cuts. Only then would one realize that almost 80% of
Singaporeans are ethnic Chinese, although, ironically, the
city, like many western major cities, has a Chinatown in addition
to an Indian Village. In contrast to today's prosperity, during
the 1950s, Singapore was merely one of the many colonial ports
of the British Empire, with fewer than 1.5 million people.
In 1959, Singapore's GDP per capita was only $400. How could
this small island be developed into a splendid city and a
flourishing country from a poor village-like port 50 years
ago?
To
understand Singapore's contemporary history of the last half
a century, Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs are a must-read. Lee decided
to write his memoirs in order to show a younger generation
of Singaporeans -- who may take stability, growth and prosperity
for granted -- that these conditions did not come naturally,
but required ceaseless effort and attention from an honest
and effective government that the people elected. In his lawyer's
steady, precise and clear language, he describes the perils
of communist insurrection, communal riots and intimidation
during the Malaysia years; he explains his strategy and approach
to each challenge. In his forward to the memoirs, Henry A.
Kissinger says that the father of Singapore's emergence as
a state favors the ancient argument of whether circumstance
or personality shapes events for the later generations. Interwoven
with his pride for his achievements is his hope that the younger
generation of Singaporeans will be vigilant and conscientious
in maintaining Singapore's independence and vitality in an
increasingly globalized world.
The
first volume of Lee's memoirs covers his family background,
his student years in Cambridge, and his budding political
career as a lawyer for labor unions and student associations.
It gives a detailed account of his experiences as an assemblyman
of an opposition party, People's Action Party (the PAP), and
being an exceptionally young prime minister in a self-governing
British colony from 1959 to 1965, during which time he forged
a merger with Malaya in 1963 and divorced from Malaysia in
1965. The second volume covers the period from Singapore's
independence up to the present day, with the first half of
the book devoted to building a clean and effective government
and a fair society, under his label "getting the basics
right"; and the second half of the book devoted to Singapore's
diplomacy in search for regional and international space.
Professor
Ezra Vogel of Harvard University, in his book "The Four
Little Dragons", delineates a rather wide range of institutional
and traditional factors that underlie the successful industrialization
of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. He points
out that the most special factor in Singapore's success story
is its genuinely charismatic leader, Lee Kuan Yew. Lee was
the youngest Prime Minister in the world, not even 36 years
old, at the time of his appointment in 1959. Being one of
the longest party leaders in modern history, holding 38 years
of leadership since he established the PAP in November, 1954,
he has solidly put his personal stamp on many aspects of Singapore
- its recent history, its ideology, its languages and its
social norms.
Lee
Kuan Yew's Relationship with the Communists
Lee
Kuan Yew's relationship with the communists was complex. People
from the left criticized him as "a stooge of the colonialists",
and people from the right claimed that "the PAP is pro-Communists",
as Dr. Mahathir Mohamad said in 1965, who later became Prime
Minister of Malaysia in the early 1980s. This is because Lee
had mixed feelings about the communists. On the one hand,
Lee admired the skills and dedication of unyielding communists;
on the other hand, being a Cambridge trained lawyer, he respected
rule and order and thought being chauvinists would only make
matters worse. At different times, different aspects of his
thinking, in view of external circumstances, dominated his
orientation towards the communists.
It
is hard to imagine today the psychological grip of communism
in the 1950s and 1960s on the Chinese-speakers, who constituted
about 76% of the Singapore's population at that time. There
were several interrelated reasons for the strong surge of
communism during this period. Chairman Mao Zedong's successful
revolution in China of 1949 provided constant inspiration
to many Chinese in Singapore. The communists made these people
believe that what had happened in China would also come to
pass in Singapore and Malaysia, that communism was the wave
of the future, and those who opposed them would be buried
by history. One characteristic of being Chinese overseas is
the interminable kinship relations in Mainland China. Being
patriotic, many of them donated money and materials for China's
anti-Japanese war. They even had the aspiration of being part
of China. Critics in Singapore's neighboring countries called
Singapore "little China of Southeast Asia".
Another
factor that contributed the hardcore followers of communism,
about 30% of the electorate of Singapore, was that many graduates
from Chinese schools, especially those from Nanyang University,
did not have English proficiency and were excluded from good
jobs in Singapore. Their dissatisfaction with employment prospects
interwoven with their resentment of the British imperialists
provided fertile soil for the spread of communist ideas. Leaders
of trade unions, Chinese clan associations, Chinese Chamber
of Commerce, and students in Nanyang University and other
Chinese schools, organized demonstrations and protests one
round after another. So in order to move up young graduates
on the economic ladder, Lee determined to switch all schools
to using English as the teaching language in the 1960s and
70s, knowing that language was a highly sensitive and emotional
issue to many people.
Lee
Kuan Yew was impressed by the total devotion of many young
Chinese to communism, and served as a legal advisor in the
early 1950s to trade unions with an intention to collect them
as his own political supporters. Using anti-colonialism as
the common denominator and the communists' initiative of forming
united front, Lee formed an alliance with the communists by
meeting discreetly in 1958 with the communist underground
leader, Fang Chuang Pi, whom he calls "the Plen".
While he preferred to play within the existing legal framework,
using reasons and pragmatism to achieve Singapore's independence,
the communists wanted to completely destroy the existing system
and establish communist rule, knowing that would inevitably
mean bloodshed. Nonetheless Lee played along with pro-Communists'
popularity. With the support of the communists, Lee won decisively
in the general election of 1959, and was formally sworn in
as the Prime Minister of the self-governing state of Singapore.
When
Lee was the leader of an opposition party, the PAP, in the
congress from 1954 to 1959, he observed that when the government
arrested the leaders of demonstrations and protests they were
considered heroes by the people who were against the British
imperialism. He learned that simple arrest of demonstration
leaders would only alleviate the social tension and would
not help achieve independence at all. After becoming Prime
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew did not want to make the mistake that
his predecessors, David Marshall and Lim Yew Hock, had made.
He did not want to arrest demonstration leaders and had explosive
confrontation with the public when the communist-inclined
leaders' apparent self-sacrifice and dedication encouraged
many more people around them to become pro-Communist and to
form a united front against the British colonists. In order
to dilute the influence of the communists in a bigger population
and at the same time achieve independence from the British,
Lee actively sought to merge with Malaya, despite his early
recogniton of the differences in leadership style between
him and Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya, and
between the ministers of both sides. The communists were strongly
against the merger because they were afraid that they would
lose the advantageous position of having a large portion of
the population being Chinese, and that they would never be
able to be in charge of the government in Kuala Lumpur.
Lee
Kuan Yew defined the official position of the PAP as being
"non-communist" rather than "anti-communist".
Lee was never a communist in appearance or in his heart. He
thought the communists were really looking for mass destruction
and anarchy under the name of anti-imperialism. His fundamental
difference with the communists provided the British with a
least bad alternative later in their preparation to withdraw
from Singapore. Lee's refusal to give more room to the communists
to organize in his secret meeting with the Plen in May 1961
resulted in a split of the PAP in August 1961. Thirteen pro-Communist
PAP assemblymen broke off to form the Barisan Sosialis. This
presented the most serious threat in Lee's political career.
He survived this challenge by merely one vote in the assembly,
which enabled the PAP to remain as the majority. After the
successful passage of the referendum on merger with Malaya
in September, 1962 but before the completion of the merger
in 1963, Lee notified the Plen in public that he should leave
Singapore because Kuala Lumpur would be in charge of Singapore's
internal security after September, 1963. Thus Lee could claim
many years later in 1995 when he met the Plen in Beijing that
he did a fair play with the communists who supported him in
becoming the Prime Minister in 1959.
Lee
Kuan Yew is a keen observer and a fast learner. Through his
dealings with the communists over many years, he learned numerous
organizational techniques from the communists and applied
them in the PAP. After he formed the government in 1959, In
order to combat the psychological grip of communism and to
educate the English-speaking civil servants who lacked understanding
of the political danger they were in, Lee set up a political
center to teach top-ranking civil servants about the communist
threat and the prevailing social and economic problems. He
also launched well-publicized campaigns to clean the streets
through mobilization of everyone, including ministers to toil
with their hands and soil their clothes in order to serve
the people. He tried his best to prevent the communists from
exploiting the grievances of the underprivileged or the local
Chinese.
Thus, against a background of political instability and communist
insurgency, Singapore did not become a communist country,
but was set on a path that eventually led it to become one
of the richest capitalist countries in the world.
One
Country, Four Languages
Singapore
never had one common language. It was a polyglot community
under colonial rule, with every ethnic group trying to hold
on to its own language and culture. The British left the people
to decide how to educate their children. But the result today
is that English is the working language, providing cohesiveness
for all three ethnic groups, and all students are obligated
to learn English in school today. Mandarin, Malay, Tamil,
along with English are all official languages, despite the
fact that almost 80% Singaporeans are ethnic Chinese, only
about 14% Singaporeans are Malays and 7% are Indians. The
only other country with four official languages is Switzerland,
where 75% of population speak Swiss German, 20% speak French,
about 5% speak Italian and a few thousand of people speak
Romanche. But the difference is that Switzerland is a loose
confederation of cantons, whereas Singapore is known for its
strong state. Lee says, "If Singapore is a nanny state,
I'm proud to be the nanny." How did the nanny alter the
laissez-faire approach that the British successfully fostered
in Hong Kong?
The
Chinese language and culture are among those most resilient.
Even in Yuan and Qing dynasties, when China was ruled by the
Mongols and the Manchus respectively, it was those foreign
rulers who adjusted themselves to the rich Chinese language
and culture rather than the other way around. Another characteristic
of the Chinese, in addition to keeping their kinship relations,
is their tenacious uphold of their language and culture. In
this respect they are similar to the French. The Chinese-speaking
parents definitely wanted their children to be educated in
Chinese for their cultural identity. Successful Chinese merchants
who helped finance Chinese schools and Chinese cultural activities
supported this wish. In Singapore, the Chinese tend to do
better than other ethnic groups, both educationally and financially.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the teachers unions of
Chinese schools all actively promoted the Chinese language
and culture throughout the 1950s, 1960s and well into the
1970s. As Communism was spreading among many trade unions,
Chinese schools and clan associations under the slogan of
the united front, the communists also tried to accentuate
the importance of the Chinese language. All of these made
the fact that the Chinese language did not prevail in Singapore
seem implausible.
Ironically,
Lee Kuan Yew, being ethnic Chinese, could barely speak his
mother language. He grew up speaking English with his parents.
In order to have direct communication with various ethnic
groups in his campaign in the late 1950s, he made intense
efforts to learn Hokkien, Mandarin, and Malay. Being able
to give speeches in native languages helped subdue the accusation
that Lee was a "stooge of the colonists" and made
it easier for the non-English educated to accept him as their
leader. Recognizing the importance of English in international
commerce and the strong emotional attachment of ethnic groups
to their native languages, Lee decided early on that the only
politically defensible position on the language debate was
to make three native languages all official, and use English,
of which Lee is a master, as the working language so that
no race would have an advantage.
Lee
realized early on that English is the future of international
commerce, which is what Singapore is all about. To promote
the teaching of English and at the same time to avoid being
seen as "an oppressor in a government of pseudo foreigners
who forget their ancestors" were tricky. But Lee Kuan
Yew is a political genius. He was able to manage these conflicting
objectives at the operational level. In order not to alienate
his Chinese base, he sent all three of his children to Chinese
schools until his two sons finished their primary schools
and his daughter finished her high school. He had journalists
of major newspapers taken his pictures when he visited his
children in Chinese schools. He made intense efforts to master
Malay in preparation for his campaigns in the late 1950s and
60s, so that the Malays and Indians perceived him as a Singaporean
nationalist, rather than a Chinese chauvinist. He was accepted
as a leader of more than just for the Chinese speaking.
Lee
introduced the teaching of three languages, Mandarin, Malay
and Tamil, in English schools. This was well received by all
parents. To balance this, he introduced the teaching of English
in Chinese, Malay and Tamil schools. Malay and Indian parents
welcomed this, while a hard core of the Chinese-educated did
not welcome what they saw as a move to make English the common
working language, and expressed unhappiness in Chinese newspapers.
They berated those who chose English schools as money-minded
and shortsighted. Many Chinese-speaking parents who were deeply
attached to their language and culture could not understand
why their children were allowed to be educated completely
in Chinese under the British, yet under their own elected
government had also to learn English.
Lee
Kuan Yew restated publicly that all four major languages in
Singapore were official and equal. He met the committees of
all four chambers of commerce under the full glare of television
lights in 1965, and made it clear that he would not allow
anyone to exploit the Chinese language as a political issue.
He was also acutely aware that no country in Southeast Asia
wanted a Chinese-language university. On the contrary, they
were phasing out Chinese-language schools. Employment opportunities
for Chinese-educated high school and university graduates
were rapidly declining. To deal with the remaining opposition
from students of Nanyang University and to make up the English
deficiency of its faculty members, Lee persuaded the school
council to move the whole university - staff and students
- into the campus of the University of Singapore in 1978,
so that both teachers and students would be forced to use
English and share English-teaching facilities. The majority
of Chinese-seeking parents and students accepted this change
as unavoidable. He only wished that he had merged the two
campuses earlier, thereby saving several thousand Nanyang
graduates from their poor economic status, handicapped by
their inadequate command of English. Thus the Chinese language
and culture did not dominate the landscape of Singaporeans'
social life despite the overwhelming proportion of the Chinese
in the total population.
Singapore's
Relationship with Malaysia
Singapore's
relationship with Malaysia is unusual. Malaya became independent
from the British in August 1957 and became Malaysia in 1963
with the inclusion of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah on the
island of Borneos. But Singapore was separated from Malaysia
and became an independent country two years later, in August
1965. Singapore is more resource-poor than Japan. It has almost
no natural resources aside from its deep-water ports. Only
4% of the total area is arable land. Although the scientific
research of growing vegetables in water on roofs of buildings
is successful, to apply this result widely encounters logistical
and technical difficulties such as plumbing system of a building.
Singapore still has to rely on Malaysia today to provide most
of its food and fresh water, their lifeline for the island.
Whenever there is a tension between Malaysia and Singapore,
Malaysia uses cutting water supply as a threat to make Singapore
yield. How could Singapore manage?
This
bilateral relationship is perplexing until one reads Lee Kuan
Yew's memoirs. After the breakup with the pro-Communist members
in the PAP in 1961, Lee sought an alliance with Malaya mainly
for two reasons. He realized that Singapore could never achieve
complete independence from the British simply because it was
too small in area and could not defend itself. He also wanted
to submerge the overwhelming pro-Communist sentiment in Singapore
in a much bigger country Malaya, where Chinese were a minority.
The Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was a friend
of Lee back in their Cambridge years. But he was against the
merger because he was afraid that Chinese-dominated Singapore
would disturb the racial balance in the whole country. The
British came up with an ingenious way to solve this problem.
They suggested to include Sabah and Sarawak, two nearby British
colonies, in the merger so as to keep the original Chinese
proportion of Malaya unchanged. With Malaya holding the big
umbrella for Singapore, the British finally gave up control
of Singapore's defense and foreign policy. The Federation
of Malaya became Malaysia through this four-way merger in
September 1963.
Tunku,
according to Lee, forced the separation of Singapore from
Malaysia two years later. But according to other sources,
Tunku claimed, "Lee wanted it." What happened is
that Lee disagreed with Tunku on a number of important issues.
Lee supported a Malaysian Malaysia as a multiracial society
of equal citizens, while Tunku wanted a Malay-dominated Malaysia.
They also differed on economic policies such as tax revenue
sharing policy. Being who he is, Lee criticized publicly some
federal policies. He continued visiting foreign countries
and meeting with foreign officials, speaking on behalf of
Singapore. From Lee's point of view, all he wanted was a practical,
business-like working relationship with Tunku, not a loyalty-based
relationship. But his bold leadership style offended Tunku.
Tunku wanted to bring him down and cultivate his own man as
leader in Singapore.
Saving
Lee again this time were the British, according to Lee's discovery
from the British archive. He had actively made contacts with
supporters of the British Labor Party and anti-colonial Malaysian
and Singaporean students during his Cambridge years. Many
of them became his proteges in his later political career.
Lee had very good rapport with top officials of the British
government over the years, both in London and Kuala Lumpur,
including Prime Ministers Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson,
Secretary of State Duncan Sandys, British High Commissioners
Philip Moore and Anthony Head. His good relationships with
British Labor Government officials were also based on a similar
basic philosophy of support for the underdog and moral principles
of equality between men of all nations and races, underpinned
by a belief in socialist brotherhood. Tunku could not bring
down Lee and eventually said to him at their private meeting
in the summer of 1965, "it's better for Singapore not
to be part of Malaysia."
Malaysia's
guarantee of water supply to Singapore was part of the 1965
Agreement of Separation, which was later deposited in the
United Nations. Singapore also relied on the fact that the
Straits of Malacca had been international waters for centuries.
If any of these were breached, Singapore could go to the UN
Security Council. With these pre-conditions, Lee built an
air force for emergency use, despite the small physical size
of the country, and managed the relationship with Malaysia
through a number of Malaysian prime ministers, Tunku, Razak,
and Hussein Onn. Their relationship was characterized by Lee's
finance minister in the 1970s, "The Malaysian attitude
on economic cooperation is one of envy and disdain. They believe
that Singapore cannot survive without Malaysia and that our
prosperity is completely dependent upon them. Nevertheless,
they are irritated and annoyed by the fact that despite our
size and vulnerability, we have progressed beyond their expectations."
(p269, vol.1)
Lee
Kuan Yew was very aware of this "envy and disdain"
and was very shrewd and political in managing this relationship.
When Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was the Deputy Prime Minister of
Hussein Onn, Lee recognized that he would succeed Hussein
some day. He knew that Mahathir was a fierce fighter and could
cause lots of trouble. He decided to put behind their old
antagonism, dating back to 1965, by inviting him to Singapore
in 1978. Mahathir accepted the invitation and followed up
with several subsequent visits. Through their long and frank
discussions, Lee cleared up suspicions of each other. He won
Mahathir's commitment that Mahathir would have no intention
of undermining the independent Singapore. After Mahathir became
the Prime Minister in 1981, he asked his ministers and officers
to learn from Singapore, which no previous Malaysian prime
minister had ever said publicly. Thus whenever there were
issues straining the bilateral relations, they never blew
out of the proportion and were handled at the technical level.
Is
Lee Kuan Yew Chinese?
Lee
Kuan Yew's encounter with the British tradition started in
his childhood through his grandfather, whom he admired for
being a pursuer on British ships. Although the Great Depression
wiped out most of his grandfather's wealth, his description
of the order, the discipline and the efficiency of British
captains, first officers and engineers on the ships greatly
impressed Lee. Being the oldest son of a five-child household,
Lee became the de facto head of the household when he was
merely a teenager, because his father, in his view, was nothing
more than a rich man's son. He had much respect for his mother
as she stood up to his father, prevented her dowry from being
gambled away, and was determined to raise her children in
the way she had wanted. Lee grew up speaking English with
his parents. Because he did not understand Mandarin, he could
not catch up with classes in Chinese schools. After he was
transferred to an English school at the age of seven, he excelled
with little effort. He went on to Raffles Institution and
Raffles College. Being the first in his class, Lee obtained
Queen's scholarship, and spent four years in Cambridge studying
law. He returned to Singapore with academic distinction in
the summer of 1950.
On
the one hand, Lee is very British. Britain and its empire
constituted the world that he had known all his life, a world
in which the British were central to Singapore's survival.
While he wanted Singapore's freedom to decide what Singaporeans
should do with their lives, he also wanted and needed Singapore's
long historical, cultural and economic ties with Britain to
be maintained. His Cambridge education in those immediate
postwar years taught Lee that fundamental social changes do
not have to be violent. Constitutional and peaceful approaches
to change can yield much better results from social point
view. He acquired British meritocracy, fairness and reasoning
in his way of doing things, which distinguished him from the
Communists.
On
the other hand, Lee wanted to preserve some traditional Chinese
values and morals that he thought were good for young students
and for society as a whole. When Lee was a legal advisor to
the Chinese middle school student leaders in the 1950s, he
was impressed by their vitality, dynamism, discipline and
social and political commitment. By contrast, he was dismayed
at the apathy, self-centeredness and lack of self-confidence
of the English-educated students. After he merged Nanyang
University with University of Singapore in 1978 to foster
English as the working language, he feared loss of the discipline,
determination, and responsibility based on Chinese traditions,
morals and social values, all of which the Chinese schools
instilled in their students. He wanted to transmit these values
to students in the new bilingual schools.
Lee
felt the special urgency to do so when the increasing exposure
to Western media and America's consumerism was eroding the
traditional moral values of the students, which were permeating
Singapore faster than the rest of the region because of the
prevalent English education. Lee decided to preserve the best
nine of the Chinese schools under a special assistance plan
(or SAP). These SAP schools would admit students in the top
10% passing the primary school graduation examination. These
schools succeeded in retaining the formality, discipline and
social courtesies of traditional Chinese schools. Ezra Vogel
characterized this tension well in his comparison of Singapore
with Hong Kong in his book "The Four Little Dragons".
He says that if Hong Kong entrepreneurs thought of Singapore
as a bit dull, rigid, and too tightly controlled, Singapore's
leaders thought Hong Kong as too speculative, decadent, and
undisciplined.
In
connection with promoting Chinese traditional moral values,
Lee defined the role of the media as "to reinforce, not
to undermine, the cultural values and social attitudes being
inculcated in our schools and universities." Using examples
that press reports and photographs had caused racial riots
with loss of lives, Lee asserted that freedom of the press
must be subordinate to the overriding needs of Singapore,
and to the primacy of purpose of an elected government. Lee's
contentious treatment of freedom of speech and press has been
one of the strongest criticisms. In his memoirs, he touches
this issue explicitly in his description of his campaign for
PAP against the opposition parties in the 1950s and in his
management of public media in the 1980s. In both occasions,
he effectively used the form of public debates against his
opponents. When his opponents declined to go on broadcasting,
Lee replied, "If an accuser is not prepared to face the
person he has attacked, there is nothing more to be said."
Chinese
immigrants from different regions of South China spoke different
dialects. Lee thought only Mandarin could be the common language
for the Chinese speaking. After the merger of Nanyang University
with the University of Singapore in 1978, Lee thought that
the time was right to encourage the use of Mandarin. He stopped
giving speeches in Hokkien. The opening of China in the 1980s
brought a decisive change in the attitudes of Chinese to learning
Mandarin. Professionals and supervisors knowing both English
and Mandarin commanded a premium in the labor market.
Politically,
Lee tried to foster a Southeast Asian identity instead of
a Chinese identity in Singapore. In his official meetings
with Premier Hua Guofeng, Chairman Mao and other leaders in
China in May, 1976, he made it clear that Singapore did not
want China to embrace Singapore as its "kinsman country"
because that would make Singapore's neighbors suspicious and
isolate Singapore. He also said explicitly that Singapore
could not establish diplomatic relations with Mainland China
until other Southeast Asian countries did so, particularly
Indonesia. Lee intentionally emphasized the distinctiveness
and separateness of his delegation from the Chinese. He deliberately
included a Malay in the delegation and arranged every official
meeting in English with interpreters. He visited China more
frequently in the 1980s and 90s, and relaxed his emphasis
on his distinctiveness from the Chinese in China as China
opened up to the West. But he still prioritized Singapore's
relations with its neighbors over that with China as its neighbors
can directly impact Singapore's lifelines.
Lee
Kuan Yew's Legacies: Today's Situation
Lee
Kuan Yew's memoirs help us understand Singapore's political
culture at large and many government policies in specific.
Samuel Huntington of Harvard University, in his forward of
the book "Culture Matters" (published by Basic Books,
2000), uses Lee Kuan Yew's success in making Singapore an
uncorrupt and meritocracy based society as an example to show
that political leadership can accomplish a cultural change.
Lee's principles are passed on to his successors and have
become guidelines for many current policy decisions. His strict
adherence to meritocracy, delivery of promises and emphasis
on some traditional Chinese values are all reflected in various
speeches of his successors.
For
instance, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong decided to raise the
salary budget for government employees from $28 million to
$34 million in 2001, while Singapore's public service is regularly
rated as one of the most efficient and competent in the world.
How did he justify this increase? "Judge my government
by its results," he says, " the quality of political
leadership is all important; that this is fair to make this
increase, given the ministers' huge responsibilities and impact
on people's lives." He also said in his national day
speech in 2000, "Friends are important, but a family
is indispensable." "As individuals, we must be able
to see beyond personal wants and wishes, and support policies
for the overall good of the country
Remember that the
opportunities you have had to do well came from a cohesive
society that nurtured you." Deputy Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong (Lee Kuan Yew's oldest son) says that government
scholarship will continue to reflect the meritocratic values
underpinning Singapore society, and dismisses suggestions
that government scholarships be given on the basis of need.
The
only person whose importance in Singapore's history worth
mention in parallel to Lee Kuan Yew would be Sir Stamford
Raffles, the founder of Singapore in 1819. Sir Stamford Raffles,
an official of the East India Company, purchased Singapore
from the Sultan of Johor (one of the states in today's Malaysia,
right opposite to Singapore) in order to counter the Dutch
influence in the area. This tiny fishing village, located
at the crossroads of the East and West, thus became a trading
post of the British. The British left their landmarks, including
Raffles Hotel, the most prestigious hotel on the island, and
Botanic Garden on the Orchid Road, a collection of world rare
flowers and plants, as well as a law-based community. In comparison,
what Lee Kuan Yew left is a prosperous and vibrant country,
thriving upon the principles he used to build Singapore from
the Third World to the First, which he entitled the second
volume of his memoirs.
(The
author is a freelance writer based in Boston, Massachusetts.)