The
New Trinity: The Political Consequences of the WTO, PNTR and
Internet in China
Junning
LIU
Perspectives,
Vol. 3, No. 4
1.
The Virtue of Openness
China
is undergoing a fundamental transition from a closed society
founded on a command economy, state ownership, and communist
political system, to a semi-open socialist society with Chinese
characteristics. The benefits of an open society are readily
apparent. In fact, an open society based on a market-liberal
order takes on a political dynamic of its own. And a market-liberal
order can only be created in an open China. An ethos of liberty
is best spread by keeping China's market and society wide
open. What is needed is to open China's door not only to foreign
products but also to the ideas and practice of democracy and
individual freedom. In China, openness has always been more
important than internal reform. Reform without openness will
lose its momentum and direction. If it is our hope that China
should move toward a liberal regime, the most effective strategy
is to encourage as much openness as possible.
The
influence of openness on the common people in China is more
important than it is on China's leaders. Openness will provide
a frame of reference to the Chinese people to help them choose
a rational regime that will be good for them. Chinese intellectuals
now have greater access to the world through the Internet,
publications, conferences, travel, and conversations. Their
experiences in the new, open global order have made them aware
of the existence of different political, economic, and social
systems. Exposed to alternative systems, they can and do make
comparisons and judgments about what is best for China. Such
intellectuals share their thoughts in both conversations and
writings. Students and young people would know nothing about
democracy and human rights if they were only exposed to textbooks
in schools. Therefore, openness introduces change and reform
in a "bottom-up" pattern, thus solidifying the transition.
Openness implies more freedom to choose, and further opening
brings about more liberalization.
2.
The New Trinity
Since
openness is so vital to China's transition, we should determine
what would contribute to China's further opening-up and liberalization.
The answer is what I call the "new trinity," composed
of both institutions and technology: the World Trade Organization
(WTO), Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), and the Internet
(including information technology, IT).
The
WTO is a global institutional arrangement; PNTR is a bilateral
institutional arrangement. Both are intended to provide an
institutional background to China's guarantee of free trade,
free enterprise, private property, and a free-market economy.
PNTR is the cornerstone of China's membership in the WTO.
That is because China's opening-up has its own meaning, namely,
to open up to the West, not merely to other poor communist
countries in the Third World.
The
Internet and IT are unprecedented technological forces that
empower China's march toward globalization, a free market,
and an open society. The technologies have overwhelmingly
overcome the geographical gap that historically has inhibited
the extension of a market-liberal order. The institutional
precondition for the Internet in China is membership in the
WTO and PNTR with the United States. There is no space for
the World Wide Web in a closed society that is outside economic
globalization and has no access to international venture capital
and information technology. What the rulers of a closed society
fear most is the unintended consequences of an opening-up.
The Internet is the most powerful force that has ever existed.
The WTO and PNTR will do more than pull down trade barriers:
with the aid of IT and the Web, they will dismantle the bamboo
curtain that separates the Chinese people from the principles
of democracy and individual freedom.
The
new trinity is contributing greatly to the formation of a
private realm and a civil society in China and to the promotion
of China's economic and political reform, delimiting the scope
and power of the government and speeding up the process of
marketization and privatization. The common people in China
will become increasingly independent of the government, economically,
politically, and psychologically. In present-day China, there
are many users of Hotmail, Yahoo, and many other outside-China
online toll-free webmail service providers whose mail servers
are located overseas. This is not only because the users want
to save money; more importantly they want their communications
to be free of surveillance. In addition, the Internet is already
acting as an alternative to the postal service and telecommunications
that are monopolized by the government.
The
new trinity might not bring about a democratic breakthrough
immediately, but it will certainly expose the Chinese people
as never before to liberal values and democratic institutions.
That is why openness has been so important to China and other
closed societies, just as glasnost was to the former Soviet
Union.
A
closed society breeds monopoly, both economically and politically.
The new trinity will help break the monopoly of power and
wealth in China. One of the most important functions of a
closed society is to prevent the institutional competition
among different regimes, to shut the society off from linkages
to open societies, free-market economies, and liberal democracy.
The new trinity is doing a very good job of breaking through
China as a closed society and facilitating the peaceful competition
between liberal regimes and their tyrannical counterparts.
The socioeconomic changes brought about by the new trinity
will shift resources and power from the government to the
hands of the common people, allowing them to be more independent
and less dependent on the government than ever before.
Therefore,
the value of the new trinity lies in the benefits it will
bestow, not only on the privileged, but also on the common
people in China. It can be expected that the new trinity will
change the Chinese people's attitudes toward capitalism and
democracy, even if it will not change the minds of the leaders
or motivate them to start a democratic revolution. China's
integration into the globalization process promoted by the
new trinity will ultimately result in an open society and
liberal democracy. Free trade is something more than making
money by trade. It is the extension of free markets and individual
freedom across political boundaries. For that reason, individual
freedom and liberal democracy are effectively advanced by
free trade and free communications facilitated by the new
trinity.
Although
the new trinity in itself will not bring political changes
overnight, it can be an important catalyst for change over
the long term if it is combined with other joint efforts from
outside China.
3.
Freedoms and Rights
History
has shown that the best route to freedom and prosperity is
to introduce market liberalism into a closed society. As James
Dorn of the Cato Institute has convincingly pointed out, "free
trade is not a privilege but a right" (Dorn 1996: 95).
He argues that to advance free trade is to advance human rights,
given that the rights to own property and to trade are natural
rights. Freedom to trade without interference-provided one
respects the equal rights of others-is a fundamental principle
of a market economy and an integral component of human rights
(Dorn 1996: 78-79). Therefore, freedom to trade is one of
the liberties that many Chinese individuals and enterprises
have acquired in the past two decades.
Is
WTO membership or PNTR a reward for undeniable human rights
violations in China? Partly, the answer is yes. The power
elite will certainly amass fortunes from their business with
the West. But if we take a look at the other side of the coin,
we will realize that a rejection of WTO membership and PNTR
will not stop the hands of human rights violators and will
not help improve the human rights record in China. Otherwise,
the human rights situation in North Korea-which is not a member
of the WTO and whose people enjoy no PNTR with the United
States and have no computers or access to the Internet-would
be much better than that in China.
From
a bottom-up perspective, the more open and liberalized China
becomes, the more freedom and rights the Chinese people will
enjoy. For example, access to capital is fundamental for every
individual who wants to better his or her life. The new trinity
has provided unprecedented access to global capital, to global
markets, to the stock markets, and to information. The Internet,
rather than laws, more and more guarantees the Chinese people
freedom to acquire information, despite the government's tight
control over all media. Today, one can "surf" the
Web for virtually any kind of information and usually access
it for free. One can learn about the democratic development
in Indonesia or follow the campaign and democratic elections
in Taiwan. Perhaps Internet proxy skills are no more widely
used in the world than they are in China. The Internet now
offers Chinese citizens more information than ever before
about their own country and about the outside world.
China's
opening-up has also resulted in the expansion of consumer
choice, the spread of culture, the development of a commercial
code, the strengthening of property rights, and the growth
of civil society. A typical example is the Chinese people's
awareness of intellectual property rights, as kindled in China
by companies from the United States and other Western countries.
Just a few years ago, the issue of intellectual property rights
was a totally foreign concept. Now, countless people, from
professors to software programmers, from entertainers to popular
writers, are all concerned about the advantage of intellectual
property rights. As Alan Greenspan (2000) correctly understands:
History has demonstrated that implicit in any removal of power
from central planners and broadening of market mechanisms
as would occur under WTO is a more general spread of rights
to individuals. Such a development will be a far stronger
vehicle to foster other individual rights than any other alternative
of which I am aware. Further development of China's trading
relationships with the United States and other industrial
countries will work to strengthen the rule of law within China
and to firm its commitment to economic reform. China's citizens
will come to have greater choice about their lifestyles and
employment and to enjoy enhanced access to communication and
information from around the globe.
The
new trinity will greatly help extend individual freedoms and
rights to China and will make China part of the worldwide
market-liberal order. The more China opens to the rest of
the world, the freer the Chinese people will be.
4.
The Rule of Law
The
rule of law is partly a byproduct of a commercial republic
based on free enterprise. As a member of the WTO, China will
have to commit itself, despite its reluctance, to obeying
global trading rules. That step toward China's integration
into the international system will regulate not only trade
relations but also the Chinese government's treatment of its
own citizens. China's further opening-up, which is being set
in motion by the new trinity, will serve to benefit both foreign
and domestic civil associations working to strengthen civil
society in China and to expand personal freedoms for the population.
There is increasing evidence that the development of a market
order and globalization will help promote the rule of law
in China (see Pei 1998 and Zhou 1998).
The
new trinity in itself will not guarantee the rule of law,
respect for citizens' rights, or substantial political reform.
Economic openness may be accompanied by tight restrictions
on basic freedoms and a lack of governmental accountability.
The Chinese government might seek to build the rule of law
in the economic spheres, while simultaneously continuing to
obstruct and undermine the rule of law elsewhere. Although
China is a long way from having a legal and court system that
functions independently of the state, legal rules do matter
in China because of the economic reforms and opening-up. Demands
to rationalize China's legal system to handle commercial disputes,
to protect contracts, and to combat corruption may help lay
the groundwork for an independent judiciary and the rule of
law. As one observer pointed out:
China's legal train must soon cross [the] cyber-pass. The
Internet poses a new challenge to China's continued progress
toward [the] rule of law. [A] weak rule of law will constrict
growth of the important Internet industry, but adhering to
[the] rule of law reduces the state's ability to protect its
own commercial interests and address dissent however it pleases.
Fortunately for its leaders, China has not yet had to face
this reality because China seems such a promising market that
many businesses and investors will tolerate massive legal
uncertainty. But the grace period will not last. WTO accession
will place increasing pressure on China to deepen its legal
reform. And in an economic downturn or sharp correction, China's
incomplete reform will contribute to local companies' decisions
to fold and to foreign investors' seeking alternative markets
where they can have more confidence about the fate of their
funds [Hachigian 2000].
The
transformation of the legal system in China is important because
it represents the transition from the "rule by law"
to the "rule of law." The state's steel-clad monopoly
over the legal process, which makes the courts another arm
of its rule, is corroding. China's economic liberalization
has spawned a parallel legal reform that raises the prospect
for the rule of, not merely by, law. People are starting to
use the court system to contest government actions that affect
their lives, liberty, and property. There has been a sharp
rise in the number of civil lawsuits against the state, and
individuals are beginning to win them. Studies show that a
growing number of individuals are taking advantage of their
legal rights. The number of cases brought before Chinese courts
grew from about 13,000 in 1990 to an estimated 100,000 in
1997. Lawsuits against the government specifically grew more
than 12,000 percent during the same period. (Guthrie 1999:
71)
Therefore,
a strong case can be made that the gradual introduction of
markets into China and the opening of China to the outside
world have made the Chinese people freer and reduced the power
of government. Even though a free market is not sufficient
for democracy, much evidence supports the argument that economic
liberalization boosts political liberalization. As markets
spread, people develop an interest in participating in the
political process through the rule of law and an objective,
independent judicial system is an incubator for freedom and
democracy. A rule-based system and promotion of economic competition
will boost the march toward liberty, law, and human rights.
If China wants to benefit from the new trinity, it must take
the rule of law very seriously by providing a fair, transparent,
responsive, and predictable environment for law and policy.
5.
Limited Government
According
to the political doctrine of a free-market economy, the proper
function of government is to protect life, liberty, and property-including
freedom of contract. As Dorn notes, "Without private
property and freedom of contract, other rights-such as freedom
of speech and religious freedom-would have little meaning
because individuals would be at the mercy of the state. The
human rights fabric is not made stronger by unraveling economic
liberties in the hope of enhancing other liberties."
Moreover, it is important to recognize that "the principle
of noninterference applies to all government action-in the
private, social, economic, and cultural spheres. Limited government
is the norm for the natural order, unlimited government the
norm for disorder" (Dorn 2000: 151). The expansion of
individual freedom always proceeds hand in hand with an extension
of a market order. The new trinity expands individual freedom
and reduces the scope of government power and action. The
protection of human rights and the rule of law is the essence
of limited government.
WTO
membership entails the separation of government and the economy.
The Chinese government cannot take sides by giving special
favors to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It will be obligated
to treat all the enterprises-regardless of whether they are
state-owned, private, or foreign-equally. Such treatment will
speed up the disintegration of state ownership in China and
undermine the power base of post-totalitarian rule. As opposed
to sanctions, trade liberalization weakens the power of government.
And the growth of the Internet signals the retreat of government
power. Greater transparency in economic matters could increase
demands and expectations from within China for more openness
in other areas. Foreign investment is already reinforcing
incentives for regional and local leaders to protect the market,
making it too costly to reverse the economic liberalization
and thus paving the way for further political liberalization.
China's
future prosperity will depend on how fast China can make the
transition to a political regime based on the rule of law
and limited government, so that liberty, rather than a system
that spawns corruption, will prevail. A free society requires
constitutional constraints to limit the power of government
so that the rule of law will safeguard individuals and their
property against the arbitrary force of the state. Like it
or not, limited government is crucial to the growth of the
market and democracy in China.
6.
Which Strategy?
It
has been noted that the new trinity is posing a great challenge
to China. But it is open to controversy whether this challenge
is positive or negative. In my view, the challenge can be
either very positive or very negative. It will be determined
by the way in which the Chinese leaders answer the challenge.
If
China sincerely wants to embrace and benefit from the new
trinity, it has to answer the challenge in a constructive
way. That is to say, it has to overcome the tremendous "institutional
defects" characterized by arbitrary regulation, Byzantine
rules, and grand corruption that create inefficiencies and
a lack of transparency.
It
should be clear to the political leaders in China that, in
the age of the Internet, the government is not able to exercise
total control over everything. The popularization of IT has
effectively made each state inseparable from the outside world,
and control and regulation have become more and more costly
because worldwide economic integration is accompanied by the
globalization of such freedoms as those of press and communication.
The governmental control over the flow of information and
capital-if it is possible at all-can only be achieved at the
cost of China's economic development and prosperity.
The
new information economy has its own political logic. Any policy
aimed at limiting the flow of information will be doomed to
failure. There are already about 16 million Internet users
in China (CNNIC, 2000). Even according to a more cautious
estimation, the online population is "doubling every
six months and the total is likely to reach 20 million by
the end of 2001, about the size of the online population in
Germany or France" (ChinaOnline, 2000). It is further
estimated that this number will reach 100 million by 2007.
After entry into the WTO, the Internet will be available to
many more people in China because the price will decline further.
The Web is becoming too global to be policed. It is already
beyond the government's capability to control every telephone
and facsimile machine. How can it possibly win a battle of
"one versus tens of millions"? How can tangible
sovereignty based on geographical territory cover an intangible
and endless cyber universe? This is not to mention the fact
that the transfer of power resulting from globalization and
the new economy has been changing the pattern of power distribution,
shifting the power from the center to the localities, from
government to the private sector, from the organization to
the individual. As an American observer has found, "In
the United States, there is fear that the Web will isolate
people. In China it brings people together outside the control
of the government" (ChinaOnline, 2000).
Under
a negative strategy, the new trinity in China will guarantee
neither the rule of law, nor respect for human rights, nor
meaningful political reform. Economic openness may be accompanied
by tighter restrictions on basic freedoms, further lack of
governmental account-ability, and more regulation and corruption.
But that strategy has its costs and problems; for instance,
the monopoly of the telecommunications industries has eliminated
almost all private Internet service providers in China.
However,
even economic troubles can spur reforms, to say nothing of
political troubles. The rapid developments of the Internet
and economic globalization have already placed increased pressure
on the highly centralized and heavily regulatory system of
governance in China, and have widened the conflicts between
the emerging market economy and the traditional planning regime
(Forum on Internet Development, 2000).
7.
Conclusion
The
new trinity, as an unprecedented, powerful driving force in
China since the start of the opening-up and reform in the
late 1970s, will provide a strong dynamic for China's internal
political evolution. China's entry into the WTO implies that
China will be formally incorporated into the global capitalist
system characterized by an open society, a free market, and
liberal democracy. At the same time, it should be admitted
that it will take time and patience for its political logic
and its consequences to gradually unfold in China.
There
is sufficient reason to believe that the most likely route
to freedom and prosperity in China is to keep the country
open. Greater economic freedom will spill over into greater
political freedom, as it has in other parts of Asia. Forcing
China to shut its door to the outside world will destroy China's
nascent market system and block the surest path toward an
open society, a free market, and liberal democracy.
By
itself, the trinity will neither lead to political changes
nor be a panacea for all of China's diseases. If we have no
confidence or belief in an open society, a free market, and
liberal democracy, then we have no reason at all to expect
that China will move in that direction; but if we do have
such confidence and belief, we have every reason to expect
that an open society, a free market, and liberal democracy-with
the assistance of the new trinity-will finally defeat the
opposing forces through peaceful engagement. A closed, isolated
society is subject to tyrannical monopoly, for which an open,
free society is the only cure.
(The
author is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Culture under
the Ministry of Culture in Beijing. This article was originally
published on the Cato Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring/Summer
2001, and it is re-published here with minor revisions.)
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