Equality,
Basic Needs and Democratic Constitution
Kambhampati
S. SASTRY
Perspectives,
Vol. 3, No. 5
I.
Introduction
The
"reforms" in the direction of free markets and democracy
are being spearheaded by institutions like the World Bank
as well as the "electronic herd"[1], which exercise
unprecedented and pervasive power and influence over the affairs
of all governments. Few would dispute that centralized management
of the economy by the state has proved to be disastrous almost
everywhere. While markets are certainly one way of decentralization,
decentralized governance by the state with effective participation
by the citizens could be more efficient in certain areas.
Economic reforms should not, therefore, be fixated on "marketization"
and "privatization."
In
addition, only the kind of "reforms" rooted in the
"psyche" of the respective people can have a chance
of success. Modern scholars from the West as well as the East
draw inspiration from the concepts of "liberty, equality,
fraternity," the rallying cry of the French Revolution.
However, when a Western scholar refers to them, he or she
probably means: "liberty; fraternity subject to liberty;
equality subject to liberty and fraternity." On the other
hand, an Eastern scholar is likely to say: "equality;
fraternity subject to equality; liberty subject to equality
and fraternity."
The
equality we are talking about is not a state of absolute homogeneity
among all the citizens (which is impossible, anyway) but a
condition in which the extent of inequality among citizens
is not such that individual liberty is compromised (Scott,
1994). As Rousseau said, "no citizen should be so opulent
that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is constrained
to sell himself." Equality should aim at "self-actualizing
individualism that encourages the individual to make the best
of himself or herself." (Glassman, 1989, pp.199)
We
are also not talking about "equality of outcome"
which can come about, if ever, only through the efforts of
a leviathan state that would surely interfere with individual
liberty. The cutting edge of political, social or economic
equality is "equality of opportunity," which is
not mere absence of discrimination but a set of institutions
and processes of governance which would ensure that "equality
of opportunity is not merely formal but in some serious degree
realizable." (Green, 1998)
The
question is how to achieve such constructive equality in a
democratic context without jeopardizing the prospects of improving
the aggregate welfare of all the citizens in the long run.
We may make some progress if we start with two principles
of "ethical individualism", one emphasizing the
"equal importance" of all the citizens, and the
other stressing that the "final responsibility"
for shaping one's future must rest with the individual citizen.
(Dworkin, 2001) Paternalism needs to be eschewed, whether
by the state or by any social, political or religious organization.
II.
Democratic Governance
The
earliest formulators of a political theory of modern democracy
were Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. For Hobbes, the people
(whom he termed as "commonwealth") held the sovereign
power. His definition of commonwealth "is one person,
of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants with
one another, have made everyone the other, to the end he may
use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think
expedient, for their peace and common defense." Locke
also recognized that the people had the sovereign right to
govern themselves but that systemic arrangements were necessary
to enable them to do so. Accordingly, he became the formulator
of constitutional law and the democratic process. Thus, both
Hobbes and Locke were concerned with providing constitutional
stability through consent.
After
Hobbes and Locke, another significant contribution to the
theory of modern democracy came from Jean Jacques Rousseau.
The Declaration of the Rights of Man in the wake of the French
Revolution was based on Rousseau's Social Contract, which
maintains with passion that all governments must rest upon
the universal participation and the consent of the governed.
The unanimous consent of the citizens and their implicit equality
were at the center of Rousseau's conception of the state.
He said: "
as there is hardly any inequality in
the state of nature, all the inequality which now prevails
owes its strength and growth to the development of our faculties
and the advance of human mind. ... It follows that moral inequality
is
plainly contrary to the law of nature." (Rousseau, 1978)
A
contemporary of Rousseau, Thomas Jefferson expressed similar
views. He stated: "I know of no safe depository of the
ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; and
if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their
control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to
take it from them, but to inform their discretion." Jefferson
thought that citizens must be prepared and educated for exercising
power; this was not only a responsibility but also a necessity
if democracy were to work and not to degenerate into some
kind of oligarchy. (Gilreath, 1999)
Seven decades later, John Stuart Mill articulated the modern
concept of social and political freedom. In his On Liberty,
he said that "[t]he only freedom which deserves the name"
was "that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so
long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or
impede their efforts to obtain it". (Mill, 1848) According
to Glassman (1989, pp.170), "if liberal theory had followed
the lead of Jefferson and Mill, socialism, as a counter-ideology,
opposed to and disgusted with liberalism, might never have
gained the credence it did."
Definition
of democracy
It
was left to Abraham Lincoln, a contemporary of Mill, to give
a pithy definition of democracy as "government of the
people, by the people, and for the people." It will be
no exaggeration to say that the succeeding generations of
people, in the West as well as the East, have grown up with
this definition in mind.
The
way some modern scholars define democracy, however, is at
variance with the spirit of the original concept. It is defined
"as a system involving effective competition between
political parties for positions of power." (Giddens,
2000) This follows the logic of Schumpeter, who is the one
to suggest, in the first half of the twentieth century, that
"government by the people" be substituted by "government
approved by the people". His reasoning is simple. "In
small and primitive communities with a simple social structure
in which there is not much to disagree on, it is conceivable
that all individuals who form the people as defined by the
constitution actually participate in all the duties of legislation
and administration." In all other cases, it is inevitable
that elected representatives should govern the people. His
own definition of democracy is: "The democratic method
is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide
by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote."
(Schumpeter, 1950, pp.245)
The
first point to be noted is that, to the extent people can
organize themselves into small communities, where direct or
almost direct interaction is possible, there would be no need
for "representative democracy" to decide on matters
where there exist little divergence in opinion.
The second issue is the satisfaction of the conditions for
the success of the democratic method suggested. Schumpeter's
four prerequisites are: 1. "The human material of politics
- the people who man the party machines, are elected to serve
in parliament, rise to cabinet office - should be of sufficiently
high quality," 2. "The effective range of political
decision should not be extended too far," 3. "Government
must be able to command
the services of a well-trained
bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a
strong sense of duty and a no less strong esprit de corps,"
and 4. "Electorates and parliaments must be on [high]
intellectual and moral level." (Schumpeter, 1950, pp.290)
It
does not seem likely that these conditions would be reasonably
satisfied in Third World countries. Schumpeter foresees this
dilemma and therefore confines the application of his theory
to "the great industrial nations of the modern type,"
which is in line with Marx's response to his own critics.
Furthermore, Schumpeter adds that "propositions about
the working of democracy are meaningless without reference
to given times, places and situations." (Schumpeter,
1950, pp. 243) In the current context of changed times, his
definition of democracy needs to be revisited not only in
the East but also in the West, to reflect a deeper commitment
to the idea of sovereignty resting with the people.
Representative
democracy
In
recent decades, democracy has degenerated into a mere "power
game." Schumpeter's elitist definition may not be the
culprit, but unchecked "representative" democracy
surely is. Over time, as Jefferson feared, "the guardians
have become the despots." (Dahl, 1998) Political representatives
have become a separate "class." (Manin, 1997) It
is not just that democratic values are undermined, the quality
of governance suffers as well. (Kent, 1997)
Representative
democracy came about partly "because of the scale and
the distance between an event and the time people find out
about it - the information float."(Naisbitt, 1994) Technological
developments have changed the context. Since the same information
is now available to the representatives as well as the represented
almost at the same time, it is no longer necessary to rely
exclusively on representative democracy.
If
communication and information technologies are increasingly
transforming ordinary workers into "knowledge workers,"
the electronic and print media are transforming ordinary citizens
into "knowledge citizens." One scholar predicts:
"the combination of television connectedness to events,
and leaders, candidates, and issues, interactive talk-back
by viewers, instant referenda on local and national issues,
may produce a new form of democracy ('mass-mediated direct
democracy'), very different in structure and process from
parliamentary democracy." (Glassman, 1997)
The
current models of representative democracy have been developed
with the following considerations:
" Not every citizen is competent to deliberate and decide
on all matters of governance.
" Not every citizen can spare the time required to attend
to all matters of governance.
" The representatives not only can devote more time but
also can acquire greater expertise in dealing with the complexities
of governance.
" The representatives are expected to bring to bear a
certain wider perspective on issues that affect larger groups
than their electors; in this sense, they are not, and should
not be, mere agents of their electors.
While
the latter two considerations continue to be valid, the assumption
regarding competence becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Citizens
are ignorant because the state does not make adequate efforts
to educate them. Ignorant citizens cannot but function through
the representatives. Since the latter assume the responsibility
(and the wisdom) to decide on all matters, the citizens have
little incentive to acquire the skills and competence necessary
for governance. To break this logjam, every citizen should
receive at least that much education as is necessary for him
or her to function as a responsible citizen, as Jefferson
envisaged.
As
regards to the time a citizen should devote to matters of
governance, it is a function of the relevance of the issues
under debate to his or her own life and occupation. If the
issues were relevant, such as, for example, education of their
children, he or she would find the time. Thus, representative
democracy need not be resorted to in matters of immediate
concern to the citizens.
However, one must contend with "a legacy of failure"
of the past efforts to "localize" democracy. An
in-depth study of some serious attempts in the United States
at "neighborhood democracy" concludes that they
would have a chance to succeed under three conditions: 1.
It should be part of a well thought-out and comprehensive
political reform, not an isolated, or administrative experiment,
2. A strategy must be developed to counter the attempts (to
thwart the devolution) that would surely be made by the bureaucratic
and political vested interests in the current system, and
3. The local jurisdictions must have the exclusive responsibility
for whatever tasks are assigned to them. (Thomson, 2001)
It
should be possible to devise structures of decentralized governance
for certain well-defined functions, where the citizens would,
by and large, govern themselves and, if need be, act through
elected representatives who would be accessible to them and
act strictly as their agents. It is high time we revisited
Jefferson's concept of "ward republics" which was
not so much direct democracy as citizen democracy. (Morse,
1999)
Thus,
we need to finesse the contentious issue of representative
versus direct democracy and proceed to delimit those areas
where direct or near direct participation of the citizens
is both feasible and desirable. In the final analysis, democracy
is not merely an aggregation of preferences; it is also a
question of the synergies it creates. Decision-making is not
only a process of choosing among given alternatives, but also
a process of generating new alternatives. It "draws citizens
out of their parochial interests, instilling community-mindedness,
and increasing the amount and variety of data that inform
collective decisions." (Elster, 1998)
Constitutional
democracy
Democracy
should thus be redefined as -- a system of government based
on equal and effective participation of all the citizens in
" setting the agenda for, and the formulation of, public
policy;
" electing representatives to implement the policy so
formulated; and
" ensuring that the policy yields the intended results.
It
should be possible to frame a "constitution" incorporating
the proposed definition of democracy, among other matters,
so that democratic institutions and processes that do not
facilitate such participation become justiciable. There is
no contradiction between the "democratic principle"
which prescribes that the government should implement the
will of the people, as expressed through periodic elections,
and the "constitutional principle" which circumscribes
or defines the role of the government so as to secure the
more lasting values and wishes of the citizens -- what James
Madison called "the permanent and aggregate interests
of the community." (Madison, 1987)
A
constitution would prohibit the government of the day from
imposing restrictions on the freedoms and rights of the citizens
that they consider fundamental to their existence, as most
constitutions already do. But a constitution should also make
it mandatory for the government of the day to take actions
that are necessary to fulfill the fundamental aspirations
of the citizens.
Viewed from this perspective, constitution making and electoral
democracy are two stages of the continuum of political process.
In the first stage, citizens determine, say, once in fifty
or hundred years, adopting the Rousseauvian principle of unanimous
consent, what their fundamental values and wishes are and
proceed to lay down the structures, rules and processes of
governance. In the second stage, subject to the structures,
rules and processes so laid down, they agree to abide by the
policies endorsed by a majority of them in periodic elections.
[2] Compliance with the constitutional provisions by the government
of the day would be secured through a scheme of checks and
balances, notably including an independent and competent judiciary,
incorporated in the constitution itself.
Framing
of such a constitution does not imply a surrender of the rights
of the citizens; rather, it is a reaffirmation of their sovereignty.
A constitution thus framed can provide for different layers
of government, the lowest tier enjoining the highest degree
of participation by the people, which can then be run by elected
representatives on the basis of a clear policy mandate they
obtain in the process of election.
III.
Economic Management
Democratic
theory is based on the initial condition of equality among
the citizens. "Neo-classical" economic theory, on
the other hand, makes no such assumption. It takes the initial
distribution of incomes among them, however unequal, as exogenous
to its analysis. "Economic efficiency" is defined,
in a limiting manner and in a static framework, as the optimum
utilization of given resources to achieve given ends. (Blaug,
1968) Thus, even if it is assumed that unfettered market forces
would ensure "economic efficiency," there is no
getting away from taking a position on the initial distribution
of incomes on the one hand and specifying the ends of economic
management on the other. It is impermissible to start debating
"efficiency-equity tradeoff" within the neo-classical
framework without addressing these threshold questions.
If the initial distribution of incomes is deemed unsatisfactory,
it would be possible to set it right through lump sum taxes
on the better off [3] and lump sum transfers to the worse
off so that, thereafter, the free market system could deliver.
This would be a neat solution but has not found favor with
most economists. (Stiglitz, 1996)
The
real question in redistribution is not so much the extent
of inequalities but how low in the economic ladder we would
allow the poor citizens to go down, given that in a democratic
society all citizens are equal and free. "The man who
is hungry, who cannot find work or educate his children, who
is bowed by want -- that man is not fully free." (Sandel,
1996) The diehard "libertarians" argue, "persons
have [only] one fundamental right -- the right to be free."
However, even they accept that "the objective needs of
all citizens should be met," but through voluntary efforts
instead of public provisions. (Pollock, 1996)
Objectives
of economic management
In
exploring a constitutional framework incorporating the goals
of economic management by the state, the first objective that
would receive everyone's ready approval is that the state
shall ensure that every citizen is enabled to develop his
or her full potential and to give off his or her best. It
goes without saying that it is possible to secure this objective
only if their basic needs are met subject, of course, to their
making corresponding and due efforts to "deserve"
them.
There
would be similar unanimity if we suggest that the state shall
so manage the economy as to secure the maximum well-being
of all the citizens. However, citizens dissatisfied with the
extant distribution of incomes might suggest that, while increasing
the aggregate well-being, inter se distribution of incomes
should be simultaneously improved. It may be that such possibilities
exist. (Basu, 1995) If they do, they must be exhausted first
before considering other policy options.
It
follows, logically, that there would be unanimity in enjoining
the state to take all possible measures that have the potential
of either (a) increasing the aggregate well-being of all the
citizens without worsening the relative distribution thereof
among the individual citizens, or (b) improving the relative
distribution among the individual citizens without decreasing
the aggregate well-being. There is a good chance that such
possibilities exist in every country. As a corollary, the
state would be prohibited from taking actions that have the
effect of reducing the aggregate economic well-being, and
also of adversely affecting the income distribution. Unfortunately,
such actions are not rare.
It
is next necessary to seek the agreement of the citizens on
another important dimension of securing the maximum well-being
of all the citizens, namely, that it should be accomplished
without compromising the well-being of the future generations.
This concern has been very succinctly expressed as follows:
"Sustainable development is that development which meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs.
This
means avoiding the accumulation of environmental debts (by
polluting or exhausting natural resources) as well as financial
debts (through unsustainable borrowings), social debts (by
neglecting to invest in human development) and demographic
debts (by permitting unchecked population growth or urbanization).
Human development must allow each generation to balance
its budget in each of these four areas." (Haq, 1999)
These are not easy commitments to make but all far-sighted
citizens would support them.
Constitutional
provision
Against
this background, the prevalent view of constitutional jurisprudence
in the United States, and implicitly elsewhere, that "a
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory" (Holmes, 1904), is somewhat untenable. Political
theories could be as controversial as economic theories. If
political propositions could be broadly reflected in the constitution,
there is no reason why broad economic propositions should
be left out, provided that the unanimous or near unanimous
consent of the people is secured for so specifying in the
constitution.
The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United
Nations in 1948 incorporates not only traditional civil and
political rights, but also social and economic rights. Unfortunately,
while almost every nation has encompassed civil and political
rights in its constitution, sometimes as "fundamental
rights", the social and economic rights have been taken
for granted in their formalization as well as implementation.
Human
rights have undergone a historical evolution. Initially, the
focus was on civil rights -- freedom of speech, religion,
movement, etc. Around the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, attention shifted to political rights -- voting and
participation in elected government. Further advancement led
to the modern welfare state with the poor and disadvantaged
becoming "entitled" to certain benefits. (Doyal,
1991) The time is ripe for the next stage of evolution, so
that the citizens can achieve their full potential taking
advantage of the explosion of knowledge brought about by the
media and the Internet.
Social
and economic rights cannot be divorced from civil and political
rights as some of the social and economic rights, like, for
example, the right to subsistence and the right to information,
are required for the exercise of civil and political rights.
(Gould, 1988) A recent critique of economic theories has also
argued that all members of a community have the right to an
equal share of a part of the national income and that such
a right needs to be specified in the constitution. (Zucker,
2001)
The
reasons for not incorporating social and economic rights in
the constitution are often stated as follows: 1. The rights
cannot be specified in such a way as to provide guidance to
the government and to the institution in charge of protecting
them, 2. The judges would not be able to assess governmental
policies on the basis of individual cases that reflect such
policies only in a very piecemeal way, and 3. The judges are
not equipped with the necessary expertise to adjudicate the
cases. The suggested solution is that the level of resources
required to meet the social and economic rights should be
specified in the constitution. (Fabre, 2000)
In
the context of the new South African constitution, which incorporates
rights to education and healthcare in the "bill of rights"
and a judicial decision pertaining thereto, it has been argued
that the courts can play a constructive role in the materialization
of social and economic rights. (Sunstein, 2000)
The
distinguished political philosopher John Rawls has had his
reservations on the subject over the years. In a recent exposition,
however, he has laid down two criteria the satisfaction of
which would permit inclusion of provisions reflecting distributive
justice in the constitution: "1. Principles specifying
fair distribution must, so far as possible, be stated in terms
that allow us publicly to verify whether they are satisfied.
2. Principles should be reasonably simple whose basis can
be explained in ways citizens may be assumed to understand
in the light of ideas available in the public political culture."
Rawls goes on to suggest that the provision of basic minimum
needs to all the citizens is a "constitutional essential."
(Rawls, 2001)
The
objectives of economic management discussed above clearly
fit the bill of Rawls' "constitutional essential".
For example, the requirement that the government of the day
must ensure that the relative distribution of income must
be improved to the extent feasible would oblige it to come
up with "incidence analysis" of the fiscal changes
it is proposing. At the same time, any citizen can draw the
attention of the courts to the omissions and commissions of
the government in improving the relative distribution. Not
including such a provision in the constitution would give
the government of the day too much leeway to play with the
economic lives of the citizens and allow it to take actions
that might exacerbate rather than reduce inequalities.
IV.
Basic Needs
The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN included:
Article 22 "Everyone, as a member of society, has the
right to social security and is entitled to realization, though
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance
with the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his
dignity and the free development of his personality."
Article
25 (1) "Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond
his control;" and,
Article
26 (1) "Everyone has the right to education. Education
shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory."
Genuine
equality of opportunity in a democracy amounts to equal opportunity
to get on in life in every sense of the term, that is, equal
opportunity to participate in the democratic process, to participate
in the economic activities, to have social interactions, to
receive education and so on. In addition, the quest for equality
of opportunity must examine the backward linkages, since inequalities
at successive stages have a cascading effect. For instance,
children born with lower birth weight due to inadequate nutrition
of the mother would suffer a permanent handicap in their physical
and intellectual attainments.
The
sense of equality of opportunity is best conveyed by the expression
"level playing field." Continuing with the metaphor,
equality of opportunity can be truly guaranteed only if the
field is leveled before the game starts. For instance, if
the voting age is 18, the democratic game starts at that age;
hence, the voter's ability to participate in the democratic
process should be nurtured before that date. Consequently,
all citizens must have equal opportunity to acquire the skills
relevant to such participation. The exercise of informed and
free choices by the individuals is at the heart of the related
economic and political theories. To equip and enable the individual
citizens to make the choices is thus a fundamental obligation
of the state.
Since
education builds human capital that, in turn, increases productivity,
the existing inequalities between individuals would tend to
persist or grow in the absence of corrective measures. Merely
enabling the markets to function freely without building up
the human capabilities would lead to an increasing gap between
the more fortunate individuals and the less fortunate as,
indeed, between the developed economies and the less developed.
(Rogowski, 2000) Thus, a basket of goods for which public
provision needs to be made should be identified as part of
the constitution-making process. [4]
Income
transfer or provision of basic needs?
Once
specific basic needs are identified, the issue that arises
is whether the provision should be in the form of transfer
of income to individual citizens or in the form of provision
for services for specified needs. Amartya Sen says: "Economists
have focused attention on a very narrow domain of inequality,
namely, income inequality. This narrowness has the effect
of contributing to the neglect of other ways of seeing inequality
and equity, which has far-reaching bearing on the making of
economic policy. Poverty debates have indeed been distorted
by overemphasis on income poverty and income inequality, to
the neglect of deprivations that relate to other variables
such as unemployment, ill health, lack of education, and social
education." (Sen, 1999)
Since
it is of vital importance for both democracy and economic
efficiency that the citizens acquire certain essential "capabilities",
it seems desirable to adopt the specific provision approach.
With an income approach, ensuring satisfactory outcomes in
the sense of building the capabilities in all the citizens
might need extensive monitoring. Moreover, the income approach
presupposes that supply responses to the demands for services
related to the basic needs, would be uniformly adequate everywhere
in terms of quality, quantity, and price. Finally, since what
is desired is equality of opportunity to acquire the capabilities,
the income approach would require income transfers differentiated
by the recipients. This would involve enormous costs of implementation.
The provision approach is also preferable for the reason that
"income approach does not necessarily lead to the choice
of appropriate products produced by appropriate techniques
that could give rise to more jobs, and even improve income
distribution." (Streeten, 1977)
Financing
the basic needs
The
basic premise of our framework is that democracy should function
on the basis of equal and effective participation by all the
citizens. To be so empowered, citizens must accept the reciprocal
obligation to pay for the primary services that comprise the
nourishing, nurturing and educating their own children. Every
citizen could contribute a proportion; say 10%, of his or
her income for the purpose. This would ensure that 10% of
the GNP is devoted to providing the basic needs to citizens.
Not many countries devote such a high proportion of their
GNP to these basic services today.
The
suggestion draws inspiration from the Indian tradition alluded
to by Kautilya (around 300 B.C.). He explained the origin
of the state as: "People overwhelmed by the law of fishes,
made Manu, the son of Vivasvat, their king, assigned one-sixth
of the grains and one-tenth of the commodities and money as
his share; maintained by that, kings bring about the well-being
and security of their subjects." (Kautilya, 1972) The
noteworthy points in this are: 1. Sovereign people constituted
the state and appointed the king (the latter not enjoying
any divine right to rule); 2. The raison d'être of the
state is to prevent exploitation of man by man ('law of fishes'
meaning that the big fish swallows the small fish); 3. The
king's duty is to ensure both the security and the well-being
of his subjects; and, 4. All the citizens assumed the reciprocal
obligation of paying a proportion of their income for the
upkeep of the state.
The
suggestion also draws inspiration from Thomas Paine, an eighteenth
century philosopher. Paine said: "all accumulation of
personal property, beyond what a man's own hands produce,
is derived to him by living in society; and he owes on every
principle of justice, of gratitude, and of civilization, a
part of that accumulation back again to society from whence
the whole came." He went on to formulate a scheme of
creating a "national fund" to be distributed equally
to all citizens, rich or poor, adding that it "will benefit
all, without injuring any. It will consolidate the interest
of the Republic with that of the individual." (Paine,
1967)
A
uniform rate of contribution on all income, without exception
and without exemption, would promote voluntary compliance.
Though there is direct quid pro quo in the form of services,
it might be advisable to classify the contributions as "income
tax". This has certain advantages in that the contributions
could go to reduce the citizens' liabilities for income tax
or other taxes, a practice already prevalent in the U.S.,
and that the monitoring and enforcement of collection would
be facilitated.
The
proportionate contribution to finance the basic needs would
have to be incorporated in the constitution with the unanimous
or near unanimous consent of the people. This would in no
way preclude the imposition of other taxes, including some
"progressive" or maybe "regressive" taxes
(like Margaret Thatcher's "poll" tax), to finance
other public services as part of the normal democratic process
not subject to the unanimity rule. Secondly, in most countries,
state and local governments currently finance education and
other basic needs from revenues collected through "regressive"
sales tax and other levies. The proposed "proportional"
tax effectively replaces those regressive taxes. [5]
Since
the incomes of citizens vary, often very considerably, the
amounts of contributions also would vary. However, since the
whole purpose of providing for the basic needs of all citizens
is to secure equality of opportunity, the actual provision
of basic needs should not be dependent on the respective contributions.
The contributions from all the citizens should, therefore,
flow into a national fund to be distributed entirely on equal
per capita basis.
The
requirement of the contributions flowing into the national
pool and disbursed on equal per capita basis would ensure
that all the citizens in the nation are treated equally. There
would be automatic redistribution of incomes from the richer
regions to the poorer regions and from richer individuals
to the poorer individuals. This would foster the national
spirit far more effectively than any other measure of public
policy.
There
is near unanimity among experts in public finance, economists
and political scientists that from the efficiency and efficacy
points of view there are definite advantages in making local
provision of these services. The disagreement invariably is
over the method of financing. The proposed arrangement would
finesse several thorny problems of decentralization in a federal
or multi-layer system of government and the related problems
of centralized taxation and devolution of the proceeds thereof
to local jurisdictions. The proposal is a scheme of redistribution
par excellence; it hurts none but benefits everyone. Through
equal per capita provision, we would have countered the main
argument against local provision that it might fall afoul
of the principle of "horizontal equity," that all
the citizens across the nation ought to be treated the same
regardless of their place of residence.
(The
author is an expert in public finance and an independent researcher
based in Hyderabad, India. He can be reached at kssastry@ureach.com.
This paper is the summarized version of a paper presented
in the Columbia University Seminar on Political Economy and
Contemporary Social Issues. The author is grateful to Jeffrey
Nugent, Ira Gang and Ross Zucker for comments on the earlier
version.)
Notes:
[1] Electronic herd is "made up of all those faceless
stock, bond and currency traders sitting behind computer screens
all over the globe, moving their money around or trading on
the Internet from their basements." (Friedman 2000)
[2] This view is somewhat different from that taken by "public
choice" economists (Mueller 1996, Buchanan 1998, Buchanan
1999). The latter is distrustful of "majoritarian"
politics and, hence, skeptical about the normal democratic
process securing public welfare. The position taken herein
is based on the premise of a benign relationship between the
citizen and the state and, hence, the legitimacy of decision-making
by the majority arising from the normal democratic process,
as the Founding Fathers of the American constitution believed.
However, the "permanent and aggregate interests"
of the citizens must find their place in the constitution.
These "interests" would include the fullest possible
scope for self-governance by the citizens. Secondly, in the
context of the overwhelming influence of the "neo-classical"
economic theories on governance in the modern states, the
"interests" would also include a financial and administrative
framework for educating the citizens to enable them to participate
in the political and economic life of the nation. In a dynamic
world, both the constitution and the normal democratic process
have their respective roles.
[3] James Tobin called it "economist's dream tax - the
lump sum tax that no one can avoid or diminish by altering
his own behavior." (Tobin 1970)
[4] The approach adopted in delineating the role of the government
in meeting the basic needs of the citizens is similar to the
one adopted by Page and Simmons (2000). However, the measures
suggested by them are in the specific context of on-going
tax and welfare programs in the U.S., while what is proposed
here is set in a wider and more universal context.
[5] See note 2 above. "Public choice" economists
would possibly stop with the "proportional" tax,
and the equal distribution of the proceeds thereof, precluding
any further tax measure by the elected government of the day.
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