Randall PEERENBOOM

Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 1

(Note: This is a synopsis of an article that will appear in Philosophy East & West 50:1, January 2000)

The PRC has often criticized the human rights policies of western countries based in part on the claim that liberal democracy and human rights are nothing more than the culturally contingent by-product of Enlightenment Europe incompatible with China's cultural and political traditions and out of step with contemporary circumstances in the PRC. Recently, Richard Rorty has offered a pragmatic alternative to liberal democracy and human rights founded on the universal claims and metaphysical assumptions of the Enlightenment. At the same time, Rorty remains unabashedly ethnocentric, asserting the superiority of ironic liberalism and "our" culture of rights.

I examine whether Rorty's liberalism and rights culture stripped of its foundational and universal baggage will prove any more congenial to the development of liberal democracy and individual rights in China than its Enlightenment parent. I conclude that (i) Rorty's ironic liberalism and pragmatic approach opens up new possibilities for interculture dialogue on rights issues; (ii) nevertheless, while Rorty's approach increases the likelihood that the parties will talk to rather than pass each other, and that there will be greater consensus and more agreement on certain rights issues, ironic liberalism is no panacea - substantial differences will remain, particularly at the level of implementation of international rights norms; (iii) Rorty's ironic liberal position could be extended or revisioned to provide for further, albeit ultimately still limited, opportunities for engagement.

Rorty does not want to abandon the Enlightenment project en toto. Rorty's novelty lies not in his basic goals or values: like most liberals (and no doubt many non-liberals), Rorty wants to minimize cruelty to others while at the same time maximizing individual autonomy, choice, and opportunity for self-realization on one's own terms.

Following Judith Shklar, Rorty defines liberals as those who think cruelty to others is the worst thing we do. While avoidance of cruelty represents the other-regarding arm of Rorty's liberalism, self-realization constitutes the self-regarding arm. Rorty is a big supporter of self-creation. He suggests that we view our lives as dramatic narratives in which we are both the main character and poet-author.

Rorty believes liberal democracy affords us the best opportunity to write our own stories and yet ensure that cruelty to others is minimized. He is a staunch defender of civil society, of free press, elections, universities, free thought and speech, the right to assembly - what he calls the bourgeois freedoms and our culture of human rights. But his defense of these typical Enlightenment ideals is not based on the belief that "undistorted communication" will inevitably lead to universal objective truth. It won't. Such communication will produce, can only but produce, culturally contingent narratives. The results will be the particular beliefs, attitudes and values of a particular society at a particular time. Rorty wants bourgeois freedoms and democratic institutions not because they lead to time and space transcending truths but because they allow for self-creation. They give us the space and the intellectual nourishment necessary to write our personal self narratives. At the same time, free press and the other bourgeois freedoms allow us to expose cruelty to others and give voice to the cruelty inflicted on us.

What separates Rorty from other liberals is not his goals and values, his advice how to resolve tough issues and settle hard cases, or his particular list of most cherished rights or institutions, but rather his attitude. Rorty believes that liberal democracy is just one more story by one more particular society at a particular time and place; a good story to be sure, he thinks the best one told up to this point, but still just another culturally contingent story. Rorty believes that other societies would be better off if they were more like us, more democratic, more liberal, but he maintains a certain self-deprecating irony that renders his assertions more palatable, less threatening, than the solemn and self-righteous sermons other liberals regularly deliver to those societies or governments that have failed to live up to a liberal litmus test on human rights issues.

Rorty appreciates and indeed seems to delight in the irony that the most significant aspects of one's life, those elements that define one as who one is, are contingent: the language one speaks, one's gender, physical appearance, family, community, the nation one is born into, the type of government, the era - all could have been different. Equally contingent are one's most cherished moral and political beliefs, ideals, values, dreams. They are a function of when and where we were born (and whom we read). Plato's Forms, Hegel's Spirit, Kant's universally applicable Categorical Imperative based on pure reason, Enlightenment liberalism predicated on inalienable rights, human dignity, autonomous agency and the notion of atomistic, rights-bearing individuals who precede and empower the state by consenting to a social contract - all are culturally specific narratives. Each has had its appeal during a certain time for a certain group of people. But to a Hindu in fifth century India, a Tang dynasty Buddhist, a European of the dark ages, or perhaps a New Confucian today, each with a rich cultural narrative of his or her own, the Enlightenment story of universal reason and inalienable human rights will appear fantastic and implausible.

Yet Rorty differs from most liberals not only in his ironic appreciation of the contingency of the story of Enlightenment liberalism, and indeed the contingency of his own ironic liberal democratic narrative. He also differs in his insistence that we join him in making the pragmatic as well as the linguistic turn. Unlike his Enlightenment predecessors and many of his contemporary liberal peers, Rorty does not see any need to ground liberal democracy or our culture of human rights in metaphysical claims about the nature of humans or metaethical claims about moral truths. He rejects the traditional philosophical project of finding moral foundations for our beliefs in favor of the pragmatic task of finding the most efficacious way to ensure that people are not cruel to each other, that the majority does not oppress the minority, that society is so structured that we as individuals are able to achieve self-fulfilment.

As a pragmatist, Rorty sees no need to get bogged down in the philosophically thorny and insoluble issues that separate the moral realist from the antirealist, the relativist from the universalist, the God-lover from the atheist. Because we can never escape from our culture-bound narrative, we will never know the answer to such issues as whether there is one true good, or whether human nature is good or evil, or whether each of us, created in God's image, possesses a sacred dignity that even the good of the society as a whole cannot override.

More importantly, such philosophical issues are simply irrelevant, beside the point. Raising these questions is not the most efficacious way to bring about "the utopia sketched by the Enlightenment" because these are not the arguments that make one a better person, a better society.

Rorty thinks the best way to win the non-liberal over to liberalism and our culture of human rights is not by engaging him in philosophical debate, by trotting out arguments about atomistic individuals who precede the state and come into the world bearing a full complement of individual rights, or by pointing out that all individuals share in common a rationality that sets them apart from other featherless bipeds. "Outside the circle of post-Enlightenment European culture . . . most people are simply unable to understand why membership in a biological species is supposed to suffice for membership in a moral community. This is not because they are insufficiently rational. It is, typically, because it would be too risky - indeed, would often be insanely dangerous - to let one's sense of moral community stretch beyond one's family, clan or tribe."

To focus on our common humanity alone is to ignore significant and obvious moral distinctions between people. As Rorty points out, "most people - especially people relatively untouched by the European Enlightenment - simply do not think of themselves as, first and foremost, a human being. Instead, they think of themselves as being a certain good sort of human being - a sort defined by explicit opposition to a particular bad sort. It is crucial for their sense of who they are that they are not an infidel, not a queer, not a woman, not an untouchable." Even if we liberals think such differences are unjustifiable or morally irrelevant, they are real, and an important factor in how the person who holds such views treats others.

Rather than trying to persuade people who hold these views to abandon them in favor of liberal tolerance based on arid philosophical arguments, Rorty suggests that we appeal to their sentiments. We tell a story that even non-liberals can relate to. Perhaps there is no rationally compelling reason not to be cruel to women, minorities, the handicapped, political dissidents, but here is a story about the life of an individual and her suffering in all its rich and tragic personal detail.... Rorty favors literature over philosophy because literature allows us to tell a story that will make non-liberals notice the pain of others, see their agony, feel their suffering. At the end of the day, literature is simply better at "manipulating their sentiments in such a way that they imagine themselves in the shoes of the despised and oppressed."

While there are important substantive and methodological differences between Rorty and his Enlightenment predecessors, Rorty nevertheless remains firmly committed to many of the substantive moral values that have defined liberalism over the years. By dumping some of the excess metaphysical baggage of the Enlightenment narrative, Rorty narrows the ground for disagreement and clears the way for a genuine discussion of the issues. But narrowing the ground for disagreement does not entail that agreement is just around the corner. When Rorty sits down with Li Peng, Lee Kuan Yew, or a farmer in the PRC countryside for an edifying conversation, he may find that the others do not share his positive view of the Enlightenment utopia. Rorty simply assumes that most people will share the same basic goals, in part because it is hard to imagine anyone being against maximizing opportunities for self-realization or minimizing cruelty to others. But even assuming people share the same goals, a pragmatic defense of democratic liberalism will only succeed if others feel democratic liberalism has indeed resulted in the achievement of those goals, that it has produced the kind of society in which they want to live. How well western liberal democracy succeeds on this score is debatable.

Support for democracy appears to be thin in China; support for liberal values and a liberal version of human rights seems even more tenuous. While there is some broad consensus, for example, as to the importance of human rights in general, any such consensus breaks down at the level of implementation once real issues arise. How much criticism of government should be allowed and under what circumstances? Should one be able to use offensive language in public? Should beggars be allowed on the street? At what point in the interrogation process does one have a right to an attorney? How long can one be detained without being charged? Under what circumstances can someone be stopped on the streets and searched? Do the police need a warrant to enter your house and, if so, how and when can they obtain one? Is the "anger of the people" a legitimate basis for meting out capital punishment? Should we accept, in the name of revitalizing communities and civil societies, a greater role for religious practices in public institutions such as schools? Are gay marriages consistent with family values, a way of strengthening a newly envisioned family or a threat to the very notion of family? For a result oriented pragmatist, this is the true battlefield, the real testing ground as to a country's commitment to the wish list of rights, and the true indicator as to whether there is in fact a pragmatic consensus and a common moral vision. Such tough issues separate liberal democrats such as Rorty not only from Lee Kuan Yew and Li Peng but from communitarians and conservatives in the United States. At this level of specificity, waiving the banner of Mr. Democracy and Ms. Rights is of no use - there simply is no pragmatic moral consensus.

In these circumstances, Rorty's emphasis on continuing the conversation might in some instances clarify the positions and help the respective parties understand exactly where the differences lie, but in the end there may be little hope for reconciliation between the various philosophical positions. We have reached the limits of Rorty's ironic liberalism to resolve differences of opinion. Rorty could tell his liberal stories until the cows come home, the edifying conversation could go on forever, and yet he and his Chinese counterparts would still differ over a host of issues.

b. Between Universalism and Particularism: A Comment

Jiantao REN
Translated by Bo LI & Hai WANG
(Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 1)

The theory of liberal democracy and the discourse of human rights are dominating modern political discussion for two reasons. First, liberalism already postulates as congenital truth in Western culture. In conjunction with other cultures, however, the effectiveness and universality of liberalism must be reconsidered through dialogues between western and non-western spheres. Second, the ideology of liberal democracy and human rights has moved from the stage of spontaneous development to the stage of active and multi-dimensional expansion. After several waves of democratic movements, which swept non-western world, many countries have embraced liberal democratic values and institutions. Even in those dissenting countries, liberalism has become the center of controversy both ideologically and behaviorally. At the same time, western countries gradually and consciously mingle their foreign policies with their liberal tradition. "Human rights diplomacy" can no longer be ignored in international politics: it demands careful study. Richard Rorty's theory of ironic liberalism is developed with this background, which also underpins the foundation for Randall Peerenboom's critique of Rorty's theory. Since the theories of both scholars are closely related to recurring puzzles in China, Chinese scholars have a responsibility to pay attention and to express opinions regarding how to strike a balance between universality and particularity of liberalism.

Rorty's intention to formulate ironic liberalism is to promote the values and institutions of liberal democracy and human rights in non-western countries. For Rorty, the fundamental elements of liberalism, including the avoidance of cruelty to others and the protection of basic individual freedom of self-realization and self-creation, must be accepted by all cultures and be recognized as a universal foundation. In contrast, the metaphysical assumptions of the mainstream liberalism were based on conditions of a particular time and a particular place: they were shaped by the values and institutions during the European Enlightenment era. These contingent assumptions weaken the rationale for non-western world to accept and pursue the liberal principles. Each country has its own religious and cultural traditions, which are the foundation of their social, political and economic structures. As a pragmatist with utilitarian tendencies, Rorty proposes to put aside the mainstream philosophical premises of liberal democracy and human rights; instead, Rorty says, western liberals should apply an ironic and skeptical attitude toward their own system and appreciate the contingency and accidentality of liberal democracy's philosophical assumptions. Only then can the dialogue between westerners and non-westerners be effective and beneficial. Instead of focusing on the philosophical metaphors of liberal democracy and human rights, Rorty intends to narrate his liberal beliefs with an ironic attitude and criticizes the contingency of the western liberal ideologies in order to find a common ground for different cultures.

Peerenboom disagrees with Rorty and criticizes Rorty's theory along two dimensions. The first dimension is theoretical. Along this dimension, Peerenboom writes, Rorty's theory has two difficuties: first, Rorty removes the philosophical cornerstone of liberalism, which leads to the absence of a theoretical support for liberal democracy and indirectly destroys the foundation of western political culture. Second, Rorty stresses contingency (particularism) instead of universalism, which distances his ironic liberalism from pragmatist philosophy and creates a conflicting situation. The second dimension is practical. According to Peerenboom, Rorty cannot guarantee that there is no need for philosophical justifications of an international convention on freedom, democracy and human rights, once this convention has practical justifications. The fundamental disagreement will persist no matter how the inter-cultural dialogue goes. The lack of common ground and meaningful dialogue can be demonstrated by the ambiguities of the existing international conventions on human rights and by visualizing a conversation between Rorty and leaders of China, Singapore and other Asian countries. For Peerenboom, Rorty fails to see the importance of religion, philosophy and cultural traditions in human rights dialogues and misses the atomistic individualism in orthodox liberal tradition and the ethnocentrism contained in expanding this tradition. Therefore, Rorty's theory is infeasible in practice. Peerenboom conceives the possibility of a Chinese way, which is based on Chinese culture, for modernizing China's political and economic system. Communitarianism is more plausible for China than liberalism. Based on statements of Chinese officials and intellectuals, Peerenboom points out the limits of Rorty's ironic liberalism, which can be seen as a 'China challenge' to Rorty's view.

Obviously, Rorty's theory is founded on the belief of the universality of liberalism, while Peerenboom's critique emphasizes its particularity. Rorty is more pragmatic than his Enlightenment predecessors. As Peerenboom points out, although Rorty's pragmatism expands the room for dialogue between east and west, it still cannot reconcile both sides to share the same culture of democracy, freedom and human rights. Therefore, the pragmatic approach itself needs an ironic critique. On the other hand, Peerenboom comprehends the difficulties facing countries like China and Singapore in accepting the values, institutions and diplomatic policies based on liberalism. When he proposes communitarianism conditioned by liberalism as a substitute for liberalism, however, Peerenboom himself also falls into the Rortean trap; that is, like Rorty, Peerenboom also has a desire for panacea. As such, Peerenboom's theory does not seem to be wiser than Rorty's and is probably equally infeasible. In fact, we can discern similarities between two theorists at a deeper level. Both scholars tolerate non-western societies and cultures, and therefore both adopt a less defensive attitude (compared with traditional western liberals) toward western values and institutions. The difference is in the degree of toleration. Rorty only tolerates philosophical differences but maintain political universalism, while Peerenboom recedes all the way: both philosophical and political differences are tolerated as long as it is not a dictatorship. I respect Rorty's tolerance for different cultures and philosophies, and admire Peerenboom's open-mindedness toward national self-determination. Nonetheless, when the former gives up liberalism's philosophical foundation, his ironic assumptions become ironic; and when the latter denies the existence of some minimum political axioms, the tolerance becomes self-disrespect. Rorty recedes from the liberalism of the Enlightenment era, while Peerenboom retreats even further. To me, this series of retreats manifest a confidence crisis among western scholars in post-modern era and exhibit their awkward feelings toward non-western social and political problems. In other words, they abandon the doctrine of universality of western values and institutions, either leaving each society to develop on its own (Peerenboom), or pursuing a common ground based on superficial similarities (Rorty). This is complete fatalism in cultural interaction.

When Rorty sees the contingency and accidentality of Enlightenment liberalism, he should also realize the common existence of liberal thinking in various philosophical systems. When he exaggerates the differences between various philosophical systems, Rorty indeed has removed the cornerstone for a meaningful dialogue. Rorty's hope is inevitably a disappointment. On the other hand, when Peerenboom perceives the rejection of liberalism by certain non-western politicians and scholars, he fails to appreciate the seeds of liberalism long-rooted in various non-western cultural traditions and their modern developments, and he also ignores the gaps between governmental advocations and non-governmental sentiments, and between elites' expectations and the wishes of the masses, in countries like China and Singapore. Therefore, when Peerenboom develops his arguments based on statements by Chinese government officials and elites, he has already reached his conclusion by choosing this particular evidence.

In this modern era, it is a shame to a country or society if it refuses to protect basic human rights and to develop a democratic system of government. Rorty's argument is therefore correct to a certain degree. Nonetheless, it does not mean that we need to accept 'human rights diplomacy' or 'imperial diplomacy' of western countries, which makes Peerenboom's view also respectable. When we ponder about the meaning of democracy, freedom and human rights, we need to distinguish classical theories from modern manifestations, philosophical foundations from political arrangements, atomistic individualism from communitarian orientations, governmental stands from the sentiments of the masses, diplomacy from the evaluation of ideologies, and universalism from ethnic particularity. A multi-dimensional approach, which reasonably separates while alternately assembles various components of liberal democratic principles and institutions, is the best way to strike a balance between universality and particularity of liberal democracy and human rights.