I am writing in Xela, the second largest city in Guatemala, whose narrow streets extend in silence, whose houses are simple and often run-down, but painted in heart-felt, bright colours. Compared to European cities, where stone angels, demons, flowers and seashells on soaring churches and enormous houses leave an impression of a serious legend, Xela's houses tell a gentle fairytale. A strange silence reigns this town, strange because this town is so visually alive. The streets are full of life. 70% population are indigenous, and the women were, without exception, wearing their colourful traditional dresses. Their statue, however, is very small, due to malnutrition and the weight of life that they are often seen carrying in those enormous baskets over their heads. People walk around, sell, and buy on the streets; abandoned plastic bags rest like butterflies in the middle of the roads. But it is quiet, as if on tiptoes, and I cannot help to think that for Guatemala, having suffered the cruelty of 36 years of civil war, a street with life but without noise is the ideal dwelling place.

I have been interested in the "Indian Problem" for some time. The problems that indigenous peoples in America face are comprehensive ones, ranging from almost all fundamental problems of poor populations in developing countries, to problems that face populations with different cultural interpretations of the world living with more political and economic power. In Guatemala the Indians amount to 70% of the population, but most live in extreme poverty. 80% of the children under 5 in Guatemala are malnourished, and most of them from Indian families. The wealth distribution is very unequal. 20 families control 80% of the nation's land, and land ownership and control had been the central issue in the violent struggles between the government army and the gurrillas in a civil war that lasted for 36 years, ending in 1996. Incredible atrosities and killings occurred during the war, wiping out Indian villages and people. The suffering of this country is very clearly imprinted in almost anywhere one looks, though by now three years have passed since the end of the war, which changed very little the wealth and power distrution in the country. Violence stopped because it was ineffective.

What the Indian population in Guatemala dream of is to own a piece of land and farm it to sustain life and better living. In this regard, the Indians in the United States of America, despite an equally unfair history of displacemen, seem to have had a better situation. In 1887 the U.S. government passed the Dawes Act, which gave the President of the United States the authority to survey the land in Indian reservations, and make allotments to each individual Indian household. Each head of the household was to receive 160 acres of land or more if the land in a reservation was arid and harder for cultivation, and each additional family member older than 18 years received another 80 acres. The Indian households were legal owners of the land, though originally the ownership was a restricted one. To prevent the land passing out of the hands of the Indians to land-hungry white settlers, the Indian households were not allowed to lease or sell their land. Yet this restriction was quickly removed in the 1890's, partly due to the political pressure from the white settlers interested in purchasing Indian lands, and partly due to the belief in economic principle that ownership with restrictions was inefficient. The disastrous consequence of this series of policies soon manifested itself. In 1928, a survey of the Indian reservation economy commissioned by the U.S. government revealed extreme poverty, decline of agricultural activities and massive loss of land from Indian hands to the whites, including the transfer of the tribe's "surplus land" and sales and leases of individual allotments. Entitlement of land did not result in economic advancement, but a resignation on the Indian part. The Dawes Act was repealed in 1934. The allotment of lands stopped, the tribe government regained some control over land use, but the damage was already done.

If our fortune to be able to study in an international setting at least partly comes from the convenience and ability to observe comparatively and from these observations delinearize forces at work behind the development process and draw lessons for our own country, then the Indian problems in America can be very thought-provoking. Why entitlement of lands resulted not in the economic improvement of Indians in the United States, as the basic property rights theory would have predicted? As the Guatemalan indigenous people fight for their land ownership, what lessons could the Indian experience in United States offer in this process?

Let's follow the Indians in the Unites States some more and ask what changes the Dawes Act of 1887 had brought to the reservations. The Congress that passed the Dawes Act at that time in fact had very little knowledge of the reality of the reservation economies. The policy makers considered collective ownership of land by the tribe an inefficient institution stifling individual economic incentive, but in fact on most reservations, even before the Dawes Act household rewards were already tied to individual effort on household land. An user rights system dependent on occupancy respected the right of the family who lived and worked on a patch of land to claim the harvest from it. Once abandoned, the land would revert to public ownership by the tribe and could be claimed by any tribe member if he wanted to occupy it. The entitlement of land by the Dawes Act thus brought the following changes: it gave a household a fixed patch of land, making exchange of land among tribal members a price exchange rather than a tribe-coordinated one; and with it came the opportunity to sell and lease land according to the will of the individual, needing not the approval of the tribe.

These changes affected the Indian economy negatively, firstly due to inexperience and lack of knowledge in determining the land value when it is sold or leased, or in realizing the land value when it is kept. The Indians sold their lands often below the market price to the white settlers, sometimes due to ignorance of the real price and the deception of the buyer or leaser, and other times due to their perception of a high political uncertainty. This problem of imperfect information might have been overcome as more white settlers entered the reservations and farmed on bought or leased reservation lands. Yet the real difference in productivity between the white farmers and the Indian ones did not decrease over time. The 1928 survey reported that on reservations the lack of education and consequently the inability to use more fitting farming equipments and new agricultural techniques including dry farming placed a wedge between the productivity of the Indian and white farmers. The Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with its often prejudices and nevertheless some truthful observations, reported that many Indians lived on the money from the sale or lease of the land, and when their daily ends could not meet, worked as unskilled wage labor for additional income. The Indian agents on reservations, appointed by the U.S. government, complained about the lack of incentives in the Indian population to save and invest. They lived from hand to mouth, and the money received from land sale was consumed rather than properly invested.

This productivity difference and lack of willingness to invest (in land or other means of production) could be explained by economics. It was likely that the money from the sale of the land was too little for an individual to invest it profitably when he is facing a high transaction cost when investing. Also when populations of different cultures were mixed, depending on how much they co-depended on each other, discrimination rather than assimilation could deter the Indians from learning from the white farmers. Yet these difficulties could have been solved if a tribe or locality of Indian households saved and invested in technology together, or if the tribe organized education programs for its members to learn from each other. These collective action did not take place in reservations because tribal organizations were abandoned, by law, after the Dawes Act, and the collective did not have to be consulted when an individual household made a decision.

The lack of motivation of the individual and the coordination failure in the tribe, however, cannot be explained completely by economics. What one does in face of adversities manifests one's "personality". What a community does in face of difficulties manifest the power of its culture. I see the power of culture as the power of interpretation, of making sense of the changing world, so that the community survives the changing environment with dignity. To borrow an economic concept again, culture is a public good: it gives priceless benefits to its members without being depleted when more people use it. It is created and maintained by collective efforts. It is like the streets in Xela, the soothing serenity that has been considerately maintained by the people living there. It gives one a consistency of mind and mood that is essential, in many ways, for rationality. A public good is often under-supplied, as more people want to be its user and not as many are eager to be its creator. The damages of the Dawes Act to the Indian communities in the United States therefore included the depletion of tribal authority that generated cultural assurance. Individuals made decisions, and their culture failed to interprete their decisions in a supportive way. Without the moral recognition from their tribes, discriminated by the mainstream American society, and their collective action to better their lives not allowed by the government, individual Indians lived without a clear unifying vision, and thus without a consistent rationality when making economic choices.

Politics and economics are important, and both the Indians in the United States and in Guatemala need sound policies and economic incentives for them to develop. The Indians in Guatemala, if given entitlements of land, will probably do better than the Indians in the U.S., because they have been more experienced and settled farmers than the Indians in the United States at the end of last century, and because 70% population here is indigenous and the rest of the population is more settled and less land-thirst than when the white settlers advanced to the West in the United States. But politics and economics are not the fundamental solution. There is something more precious and healing, something that individuals are unable to create themselves but need a larger social unit, something that gives a coherent vision and dignity. Every nation needs it. Our country too.

b. The Power of Ideas: China and the Modern Legitimacy

The Myth of the Modern Legitimacy

Our modern world is full of ideas --- ideas of democracy and liberty, of human rights and justice, of business organizations and operations, and of schools and learnings --- just to name a few. These ideas exist as social "facts" taken for granted by modern men and women through socialization and schooling, through the media and academic discussion, and through peers and friends. They have become standardized and built in our cognition, shaping the ways we interpret, evaluate and construct things around us. We rarely hesitate to refer to these "facts" as the immediate and ultimate sources of our arguments, beliefs, and even actions. It is ironic that while our modern age has constantly claimed to be innovative and diverse, our ideas have been polarized. And such a polarization is expanding, from the liberal societies to the rest of the world.

Sociologists call these powerful ideas the source of legitimacy. When ideas are widely accepted and become religion- or ideology-like beliefs, a powerful cultural and cognitive discourse is formed and legitimacy is granted or denied to individuals or groups, depending on the extent to which their social practices appear to be consistent to or deviant from these beliefs. Legitimacy exists in all known societies, from primitive to feudal and to the modern ones. But modern legitimacy differs from that in traditional societies in at least three significant ways. The first difference lies in rationalization. Unlike traditional legitimacy that is largely morality-based, the modern legitimacy is highly rationalized with technical justifications and scientific data. Although the ideas that the Westerners take for granted have their deep roots in Christian beliefs, the ideas are believed not because they are morally right but because they are theoretically efficient. They are supposed to have been derived from human history and social experiments and appear to us as "appropriate" means to certain ends. When we refer to these ideas, we refuse to accept that they are "religious" or "ideological" beliefs --- although they are so by nature. Instead, we insistently conceive of them as the default modes of humanity, modernity, and prosperity.

The second difference between the modern legitimacy and the traditional one lies in globalization. While legitimacy is traditionally built in local cultures, the modern legitimacy is increasingly globalized, resulting in a global discourse called the "world culture." Cultural globalization is not a process of convergence in which different ideas and traditions interact with one another, resulting in new and shared cultural forms. It is instead a process of diffusion in which models of humanity, modernity, and prosperity --- developed in the Western Christian traditions and carrying successful messages of Western social, political and economic institutions --- are spreading to the rest of the world. Along with the diffusion of the Western ideas are the collapse of local cultural traditions and the emergence of cultural dependence. The so-called "world culture" is celebrated by nation-states as "modern" or "international" standards; its elements are incorporated as parts of reform or modernization packages regardless of their usefulness to national development.

The last difference between modern and traditional modernity lies in professionalization. Unlike traditional legitimacy which is maintained largely by might and force, the modern legitimacy is promoted by thousands of experts, consultants, and analysts in non-governmental organizations such as the academia, non-profit organizations, and the media. These self-claimed "neutral" agents, with their resources and "knowledge," have become the most visible carriers and promoters of the modern legitimacy. They occupy a central place in public discourse and people look up to them for explanations. They serve in international organizations and help to develop various international programs and standards. They are VIP guests in many countries because they can help design reform programs or give advice to various practical problems. Our opinions, ideas and beliefs are shaped to a large extent by these knowledge groups because what we learn, hear and discuss are provided, directly or indirectly, by these people.

In addition, the modern legitimacy differs dramatically from the so-called "cultural hegemony." Cultural hegemony, in its Marxist sense, is achieved through cannon and religious commissary. The modern legitimacy, though similar to cultural hegemony in outcomes, is independent from the military, politics and religion. More importantly, the modern legitimacy has significantly altered the political practices in both national and international arenas. We can discern four different types of characters in modern political landscape, each of which plays an indispensable part in modern political games.

The Followers refer to the general public whose opinions serve as the foundation of the public discourse. This character reflects a paradox. On one hand, it seems to be the "judge" who can decide whether legitimacy should be granted or denied. On the other hand, it appears to be the "pupil" whose ideas are learned from the "teacher" and shaped by the selective or filtered stories told by the teacher.

The Promoters refer to those activists who are trying to promote the "modern" ideas of humanity and development. In the political landscape, these include various international organizations (e.g., the UN, the World Bank, and environmental and human rights groups), political dissents and activists in non-democratic regimes, and the media and politicians in even some powerful nations such as the US. The central feature of this promoter character is its claimed "neutrality" in interests and "loyalty" to the modern ideas.

The Manipulators refer to individuals or organizations who manipulate public opinions for their own political purposes under the table. The manipulation could be achieved by setting the issues to be discussed, by providing filtered and biased information, or even by fabricating or hiding "facts" and "evidence" for the issues at question. These actors are usually powerful, and what they need are to obtain public support and thus legitimacy for their actions on one hand, and to damage the image and legitimacy of their opponents on the other.

The Challenged are the public targets who do not appear to conform to the well-established norms, rules or beliefs. These targets are treated as illegitimate and their images are distorted in the media and public perception. Not only will they not receive public support, but they will also be the victims of collective actions, from public protests to economic sanctions and to political persecution and even military actions.

I call these generalized characters because each of them could theoretically be any individual and the role that an individual occupies could shift instantly depending on the issues at question. The existence of the characters of manipulators and the challenged has greatly transformed the nature of the modern legitimacy in an ironic way. It is precisely because legitimacy could be manipulated and targets could be selectively generated that we constantly observe ironic stories in our modern age. Some traditional social institutions are regarded as "cultural heritage," while some others as undemocratic or inhuman; some massive massacres are treated merely as "incidents," while others as purposive "threats" to humanity. Modern men and women now discuss all kinds of social, economic and political issues in faith without sufficient background information; they claim to be humanitarian, but they are also the supporters of military operations that cause massive civilian casualty. Generally speaking, the modern legitimacy is full of contradictions, providing a new arena for modern political games. Politics and conflicts are never ending; but in our modern world the games are played under the framework of legitimacy.

The Embarrassing Position of China

The modern legitimacy has been in the making long before China opened its door to the outside world after 30 years of isolation. As a society with 2000 years of Confucian traditions and 30 years of Communist rule, China finds it in an awkward position in a world where standard models of humanity, modernity and prosperity have been well established and prevailing. On one hand, we find these models extremely attractive because they carry stories of success of the Western social, political and economic institutions. On the other hand, we realize that our cultural and institutional traditions, not all of which are the products of communism, are constantly challenged and questioned. This is a paradox, which is inevitable for any newly arising nations. The problem is especially salient for China because of its profound history, its massive population, its significant role in international affairs, and its communist government. The ways in which the modern legitimacy works have, at the very beginning, defined two default roles that China and the Chinese people have to take --- the follower and the challenged.

China has played the role of follower in an incredible way. The flow-ins of new information, ideas and merchandises from the Western world have brainwashed many of us --- from ordinary people to patriotic students and from the intellectuals to democratic activists. We now talk about democracy, freedom and human rights as if we were experts; we have more faith in market and privatization than many economists; we admire international standards as the ultimate criteria; we attribute our previous failures to our cultural traditions without any question. While the question of whether China should be westernized has long been intensively debated among the mindful intellectuals, China is on the road of rapid westernization without any internal enlightening efforts. This is inevitable and to a certain extent healthy for a society in transition. But the short-term excitement should be offset by the fact that many of the ideas and beliefs are indeed accepted in a superficial way. As a follower, China is just a huge pool where the "world culture" finds its new audience.

China is also the constant target of challenges on various issues such as government operations, state policies and human rights practices. For many of us who are studying or working here in the United States, there have been many uncomfortable moments when China is depicted as an "evil" in politics, in media and even in public opinions. The issues are often so emotional that many of us do not hesitate to head for various "conspiracy" theories --- explanations that do not help but deepen our frustrations and angers. It seems that there are "invisible hands" by which the unjust stories about China are systematically generated and manipulated. But this is exactly the way in which modern political games are played. The challenges have nothing to do with fairness or justice but legitimacy. Under the framework of legitimacy, what really matters is not what you are but what you look like. Legitimacy is not innate or irreversible but something that could be generated or destroyed, depending on how well one could meet public expectations. Because of its "strange" Confucian traditions and Communist characteristics, China is apparently not in line with the modern legitimacy.

China will have to struggle with these two embarrassing positions in a relatively long period of time. Two popular and yet radical views about how to overcome such an embarrassment have prevailed. The first view, which is promoted by many democratic activists and liberal intellectuals, is to accelerate the process of westernization by installing western political and economic institutions. A second view, which is promoted by the Communist government, left intellectuals and people like the authors of China can Say No, is to rely on nationalism and patriotism as resistance tools. Will these two solutions bring positive changes to China? The answer is probably "no," because they fail to recognize the nature of the modern legitimacy. The first view tends to accept western ideas and beliefs superficially but ignore their underlying logic and potential fitness to the Chinese society. The second view, however, tends to over-estimate the politics under the table, while neglect the fact that struggling for legitimacy will always be a major task of development. If we are to maintain development and independence simultaneously, we have to put the problem of legitimacy to a central place. Below are some useful principles that could help to maintain a balance between being legitimate and being independently developed.

The first principle is the strategy of decoupling. Decoupling is a strategy commonly used to gain and maintain legitimacy that otherwise would not be possible. The basic idea is to pretend to conform to the prevalent rules, ideas and beliefs, while maintaining one's own practices. In other words, we have to make the most visible parts of our policies and institutional settings look legitimate, regardless of whether or not the core practices should be changed. There is tremendous room for the Chinese government to improve in this regard.

The second principle is to reach out. The negative image about China is, for the most part, due to the fact that our voices have been extremely weak in most parts of the world. We should change our traditional diplomatic emphasis from formal and governmental relations to informal exchanges with other countries (especially the United States). Our overseas newspapers and broadcasts should be expanded to reach ordinary citizens in other countries. We should change our linguistic style and use modern vocabulary in order to make our message more understandable and effective. We should also recruit more foreign students into our universities and graduate schools. All of these will pay off in the long run.

The last principle is to become a promoter. It is hopeless to be a follower or an isolator. We should encourage our students, professors and researchers to read and write about the ideas that have been accumulating throughout the western history, regardless of the irony of their modern forms. We should adopt a critical approach, trying to link the Chinese social realities and cultural traditions to the western social and political thoughts. The bottom lines are to provide solid theoretical foundations for China's social and cultural transformations on the one hand and to incorporate Chinese nutrients into the future "world culture" on the other.

These principles as solutions are very abstract and remote because they have to deal with ideas, in particular social ideas. But ideas matter, and a nation without ideas is hopeless. After a century of utilitarianist influence, China is still struggling for ideas; but for the first time it is for practical reasons. The success of 20 years of learning-by-doing reform does not improve our embarrassing positions in modern games of legitimacy. We now realize that we are facing much more challenging tasks in fitting ourselves in the modern landscape of legitimacy. Understanding the logic and mechanism of the modern legitimacy will help us not only to act strategically but also think independently.