Chinese Cultural Tradition and Modern Human Rights

Chinese Cultural Tradition and Modern Human Rights

Albert H Y CHEN

The topic of this article is "Chinese cultural tradition and modern human rights." I deliberately include the words "tradition" and "modern" in this title, because I would like to contrast tradition with modernity. If the title were "Chinese culture and Western human rights," then the theme would have been very different. The contrast would then be between "Chinese" and "Western."

The 20th century Chinese philosopher Fung Yulan has written about the discourse and thinking which employed a distinction between "Chinese" and "Western," and that which employed a distinction between "ancient" and "modern." He points out that the correct description of the task or challenge for China in the 20th century is not "Westernization" but "modernization." He writes:

"Some people say that Western culture is a motor car culture. ... But motor cars did not exist in the West originally, [and only came into existence at certain point in history.] Having motor cars and not having motor cars is a distinction between the ancient and the modern, and not a distinction between China and the West."

I think the reference to "motor cars" in this passage can be perfectly substituted with "human rights." And that is why I use the phrase "modern human rights" in the title of this article. The concept and discourse of human rights is a unique phenomenon of modernity. It is true that it first appeared in the sphere of Western civilization during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But at that time human rights represented an intellectual breakthrough and a political revolution. Something new was created that had never existed before in the history of the West -- not in the civilizations of ancient Greece, ancient Rome or the Middle Ages. The concept and discourse of human rights was a new invention in modern times, just as the steam engine was a new invention in modern times. And, as the contemporary Argentine thinker C.S. Nino points out, "[t]here can be no doubt that human rights are one of the greatest inventions of our civilization."

Skeptics may say that human rights are simply beautiful slogans, and that the reality of gross violations of human rights in modern history and in the contemporary world demonstrates the futility of human rights talk. They also doubt the possibility of moral progress in humankind, as distinguished from progress in the spheres of science, technology and material life. I do not share this view.

First, I think the fact that good ideas are often disregarded or not practiced does not mean that ideas are worthless, or that the distinction between good ideas and bad ideas is irrelevant. The doctrine of human rights is an idea, as are Nazism, Fascism, the kind of Maoism that led to the Cultural Revolution in China, or the kind of Christianity that formed the background to the Inquisitions in medieval Europe. These are different ideas, and they led to different practical consequences in history. History is a tale of suffering, cruelty, oppression and wars, and some ideas do lead to the increase of human suffering, while some others do lead to the alleviation of human suffering.

Secondly, I think it can be demonstrated that the modern doctrine of human rights is a good idea, and that the development of this doctrine is a sign of moral progress on the part of humankind. The possibility of humanity's moral growth in the course of history was first raised by Kant in his 1784 essay on "Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose." Following up on Kant's speculations, the contemporary Italian political thinker Norberto Bobbio wrote:

"My theory, which is inspired by this extraordinary passage of Kant's, is that from the point of view of the philosophy of history, the current increasingly widespread and intense debate on human rights can be interpreted as a `prophetic sign' of humanity's moral progress, given that it is so widespread as to involve all the peoples of the world and so intense as to be on the agenda of the most authoritative international judicial bodies."

Reflecting on the moral resources developed by modern civilization, particularly the concept and discourse of human rights, the contemporary Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor writes that the "imperative of benevolence" associated with the modern human rights consciousness "carries with it the sense that this age has brought about something unprecedented in history, precisely in its recognition of this imperative. We feel that our civilization has made a qualitative leap, and all previous ages seem to us somewhat shocking, even barbarous, in their apparently unruffled acceptance of inflicted or easily avoidable suffering and death, even of cruelty, torture, to the point of revelling in their display. ... [H]igher standards in the relevant regards [have been] built into the moral culture of our civilization."

To summarize the main points made so far: human rights were not part of pre-modern Western civilization; human rights are a modern invention; the rise and globalization of human rights thinking may be interpreted as a sign of humanity's moral progress; a quantum leap in the moral consciousness of humankind has indeed occurred. We now turn to the implications of the development of modern human rights thinking and discourse for the Chinese cultural tradition.

We Chinese people are proud of the manifold achievements of Chinese civilization which has enjoyed more than 5,000 years of cultural continuity. History produces tradition, and tradition shapes people's thinking and behavior. The rationality, morality, values and aspirations of human beings are embedded in the particular cultural tradition in which they find themselves. There are probably no absolute and objective standards with regard to rational thinking and moral judgment that are completely independent of tradition. There exists no "view from nowhere," no tradition-free ground, from which we can think and reason in a humanly meaningful way. This is the insight contributed by contemporary philosophers like MacIntyre and Gadamer. If this is right, then the question arises as to what modern human rights are, and how they may be evaluated, from the point of view of the Chinese cultural tradition.

In principle, there is no formal or structural difference between this question and the question of how modern human rights would be viewed from the perspective of the pre-modern Western tradition. Since this is not the topic of this article, I will deal with it very briefly, simply to illustrate the form which a possible answer can take. We can say that there were elements in the pre-modern Western tradition that were consistent with and probably contributed to the rise of modern human rights. These include, for example, the Christian conception of the equal worth and dignity of each human individual, the classical conception of natural law as based on a universal human nature and universal reason, the idea of legal rights implicit in Roman jurisprudence, and medieval political institutions providing for democracy and representation of interests.

At the same time, there existed elements in the pre-modern Western tradition that were inconsistent with modern human rights, which is precisely why modern human rights are a new invention. Examples of such elements include religious intolerance and persecution of heretics, cruel and inhuman punishment, slavery, serfdom, aristocratic privileges and thus denial of equality under the law, arbitrary exercise of absolutist powers by rulers, and the idea of the king's divine right to rule.

However, when modern human rights have come into existence, people in the Western tradition can evaluate them positively and affirm them as indicators of progress, using pre-existing standards such as the principle of universal Christian love and that of the equal dignity and worth of all human beings. So we see how a tradition can actually evolve and even transform itself, but still relying on moral and spiritual resources within the tradition and achieving a reconfiguration of the elements, often mutually contradictory, that originally existed within the tradition.

When we turn to the Chinese tradition, we can, as in the case of the West, find both elements that have affinities with, or can contribute to, the modern conception of human rights, as well as elements that contradict that conception. The former elements include the Confucian principle of benevolence as the basic norm governing relations between human beings, the ethics of benevolent rule on the part of the ruler who must cultivate his virtues and serve as a moral exemplar for his subjects, the recognition of the importance of consultation by the ruler and his following the wishes of the people and winning their hearts instead of just their outward submission, the affirmation of the moral autonomy and perfectibility of each human being, the idea of the equality of all human beings in terms of the capacity for moral cultivation and growth, the humanistic conception of the human being as the noblest creature in the natural and cosmic order, and the recognition of the existence of transcendent principles of Heaven (tianli) which govern the universe and which constitute the source of the principles of justice and ethics.

Elements in Chinese tradition that ran against the modern notion of human rights include despotic power in the hands of the emperor as the Son of Heaven, paternalistic thinking on the part of the scholar-official ruling class and hence denial of political participation from below, social relationships that are hierarchical and involving respective positions of absolute authority and subordination, the emphasis on social harmony and the subsuming of the individual within the family both of which operate to deny the individual's assertion of his or her rights and the individual's individuality, cruel and inhuman methods of punishment, harsh punishment regarding potentially seditious publication, etc.

As in the case of the Western tradition, the adoption of modern human rights by the Chinese tradition can be assessed as a morally positive development even by using certain traditional standards and concepts, such as the Confucian principles of benevolence and righteousness and the Confucian belief in each human being's rational propensity, moral autonomy and spiritual capacity for growth and perfection. Indeed, certain more recently developed human rights can be regarded as particularly compatible with traditional Chinese values. I am referring here to the right to education, since Confucianism lays particular emphasis on education for the purpose of bringing out the good potential inherent in each human being, and to the recognition of the rights of various disadvantaged groups (e.g. women, children, the aged, the disabled), since the Confucian principle of benevolence draws special attention to the needs of the less fortunate members of society. Furthermore, as the contemporary philosopher Richard Rorty argues, the actualization of respect for modern human rights depends on the development of the human sentiment of sympathy for those who do not belong to one's own ethnic, cultural or social community, and this view converges with the Confucian perspective that the principle of benevolence is to be realized by first cultivating oneself morally and caring for those with whom one has a social relationship (such as family members or friends), and then extending one's sentiment of sympathy to those situated further and further away from one's immediate social circles and finally to all humankind.

Since extensive contacts between China and the West began in the 19th century, many Western political and legal doctrines, including the idea of human rights, have gained a firm ground in the Chinese intellectual scene and in the Chinese consciousness. In the first half of this century, the discourse of human rights was well received by many Chinese thinkers and often used among political activists, particularly those who criticized reigning governments for their human rights violations. The Chinese Communists themselves employed this tactic and used human rights language in condemning the Kuomintang and in winning public support. Sadly, soon after the Communist Revolution succeeded in 1949, human rights discourse disappeared from the mainland, and for nearly four decades the topic of human rights was a "forbidden zone" for Chinese scholars. This was mainly because human rights were regarded as bourgeois political and ideological devices, and were therefore alien to and inconsistent with the socialist project. It was only in 1991 that there occurred a turnabout in the Chinese government's official position, and the Chinese government declared its endorsement of the doctrine of human rights in the White Paper on the subject. Since then, many scholarly writings on human rights have emerged in mainland China, and my own survey of these writings suggests that most scholars have enthusiastically embraced the concept of human rights. In recent years, the Chinese government has been participating more actively in the international activities and dialogue on human rights matters. This culminated in China's signature of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1997 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998 (although the covenants have not yet been ratified by China). China has also been a party to a number of other international conventions relating to more specific areas of human rights.

A development which occurred almost simultaneously with China's entry into the international dialogue on human rights is the debate about human rights and Asian values. The central issue here is whether there can be a universal doctrine of human rights equally applicable to peoples of all nations and cultures, and the extent to which culture can make or justify a difference in the application of human rights thinking, discourse and standards to different countries. For example, are there particular elements in human rights thinking and discourse in the West that are culturally specific to the West and less applicable to a cultural tradition like that of China?

Such a question raises the fundamental issue of what is the Chinese cultural tradition. Who is to interpret what this tradition is? Is the government the legitimate spokesman for this tradition? Professor Michael Freeman has argued that it is the people who live in the culture or tradition, rather than their government, who are in the best position to speak on what is the content of the culture or tradition. My own view is that there is also much reference value in the works of scholars who are learned in the history, philosophy and culture of the tradition concerned. So I would like to conclude this article by sharing with readers the views of Mou Zhongsan, probably the greatest Confucian philosopher of this century, who has devoted his whole life to reconstructing the Chinese philosophical tradition.

Mou was certainly not a liberal in the Western sense, and he was also a strong critic of Marxism. He was totally committed to Confucianism, and believed that Confucianism is the core and mainstream of the Chinese cultural, intellectual and philosophical tradition. He placed his hope for China's future on a renaissance of the Confucian tradition. What is remarkable about Mou for our present purpose is that despite his great Confucian learning and deep commitment to Confucian philosophy, he also advocated enthusiastically and without reservation the adoption of Western notions of democracy, human rights and freedoms, constitutionalism and the rule of law. His view is that such a development would not only be compatible with the Chinese cultural tradition, but would enable it to fulfill itself better than before. In other words, the establishment of constitutional democracy and institutional guarantees for human rights are in fact required by Confucian values themselves, and will facilitate their better realization. Drawing on the ancient phrase describing the best life as "inner sagehood and outward kingliness," Mou described China's challenge and the challenge for contemporary Confucians as "the opening up of a new mode of outward kingliness", which he identified as the way of democracy and human rights.

Like a number of twentieth century Confucian thinkers, Mou believed that the seeds for democracy and human rights lie within the Chinese cultural tradition itself. He developed his own philosophical vocabulary to discuss this aspect of the Chinese cultural tradition and the mechanics of its modernization. In his theory, the Chinese cultural tradition, particularly Confucianism, already generated and developed to the full rationality or reason in its "intensional" meaning (i.e. the content and application of the spirit of democracy and respect for human rights). What it lacked was rationality in its "extensional" meaning (i.e. the form and institutional structures of democracy and respect for human rights). Confucian ethics and Confucian doctrines about human nature, human relationships and, in particular, the moral obligations of rulers, exemplify the intensional aspect of rationality. However, it is in the West that the extensional aspect of rationality first matured, and this aspect comprises elements such as democracy, human rights, constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, parliamentary institutions and the rule of law. Yet Mou pointed out that this development in the West is not culturally specific to the West, but has universal significance and general applicability for all rational peoples and cultures.

As another contemporary Confucian philosopher Zhai Zhicheng points out, the cultural sphere of a tradition includes ethics, the arts, politics and science. In modern times, China has fallen behind the West in the domains of politics and science. But the realm of ethics and the arts are where the strengths of the great Chinese cultural tradition lie. So the Chinese people should re-discover these strengths in their own tradition and restore their confidence in the achievements of this tradition, while at the same time learning from the political and scientific achievements of modern Western civilization. Thus it would be possible for us to rehabilitate the virtues and insights of Confucianism and other precious elements in the rich and great Chinese cultural tradition which modern Chinese deserve to feel proud of, and simultaneously work for the further democratization and better protection of human rights in China of the 21st century. This, I believe, is the way forward for China, and the lesson finally learnt from the immense sufferings which the Chinese people have endured in the throes of modernization in the last two centuries.

(The author is Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.)