|
Political Parties and Consolidation of Democracy: The Case of Russia Hongwu
OUYANG 1. Are Political Parties Still Necessary for Democracy? No matter how we define modern democracy, one thing is for sure: a democratic system requires intermediary groups between state and society as well as institutional mechanisms for the articulation and advocacy of diverse views and policy preferences. The challenge for scholars is to find out whether the intermediary mechanism should necessarily be political parties. As modern technology progresses, especially as the Internet emerges as a powerful communication medium, many writers have doubted the necessity of political parties for that proper functioning of democracy based on several reasons. First, electronic communication shortens the distance between voters and political candidates, who can now appeal to their constituency directly via electronic mass media and the Internet. Therefore, there is no need for political parties to play the role of intermediary. Second, the flourishing of civil society and various interest groups makes political parties less important in politics. All interests, views or ideologies can be represented by interest groups. Larry Diamond describes eight functions played by civil society: (1) providing a basis for limiting the state power and checking the potential abuses of power; (2) supplementing the role of political parties in stimulating political participation, increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens, and promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship; (3) serving as an arena for the development of other democratic values such as tolerance, moderation, willingness to compromise, and respect for opposing viewpoints; (4) creating channels other than political parties for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of different interests; (5) helping to generate a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and thus mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflicts; (6) recruiting and training new political leaders; (7) helping build democracy such as through monitoring elections; and (8) disseminating information to help citizens to pursue their interests. Apparently there is a great deal of overlapping among the functions of political parties and interest groups. Third, the convergence of political parties in policies and ideologies makes inter-party competition far less important. In modern democracies, the differences between political parties regarding ideologies and policy programs tend to decrease. The convergence of policies of the British Labor Party and Conservative Party is a good example. Seeking median voters' votes drives political parties to position themselves so as to appeal to the majority of voters. As a result, political parties become less differentiated than before. Since political parties are converging, competition between parties becomes unnecessary and a waste of resources. Hence, there is no need to hold on to party politics. On top of the analytical reasons, modern voters also become disgusted by political parties and career politicians, and view them as being corrupt and the obstacles to reform and policy innovation. Political establishments have come to be viewed as formidable barriers to progresses. Therefore, some writers argue, that less party politics might be better for development and reform. In my opinion, a political party is a network organized and steered by politically ambitious people who share similar ideologies and try to enlist people interested in politics in order to extend their influence and strengthen their drive for public positions. With this definition of a political party, I will argue that political parties are still indispensable for modern democracies even in the electronic age. First, although electronic communication provides individual voters with better access to desirable information and gives ambitious politicians more opportunities to directly appeal to voters, voter mobilization as well as ideology and policy articulation, two major functions of political parties, still cannot be replaced. On-line appeals and persuasion is still passive, and its effectiveness limited. Candidates need local party networks, which are more effective in influencing and mobilizing voters. Furthermore, only relying on electronic media and excluding political parties might enable a few wealthy individuals to become candidates and win elections simply because they are able to afford to dominate the electronic media. Second, civil society and various interest groups do not replace, but only supplement, political parties in many regards. Although overlapping functions do exist between these two organizations, political parties are more power-oriented and action-oriented, and have more comprehensive programs with regard to a wide range of social, political, economic and cultural issues. Civil groups usually target certain segments of the society and address specific issues. When an interest group addresses a large number of issues concerning a large number of segments of the population and takes actions to influence government polices and even the composition of the government, this interest group is not much different from a political party. Germany's Green Party is a good example in this regard. With appropriate conditions, interest groups can turn into political parties. Third, the convergence of parties in policies and ideologies poses new challenges to political parties, but it does not declare the end of party politics. Convergence does not mean that parties have the same position on every single issue. Different political parties still provide choices for voters. After all, voters are like customers who prefer choosing among many brands of toothpaste, even though there is no big difference among these brands. Finally, the fact that people have become disenchanted by corruption and partisan politics does not mean that parties should be removed from the political stage. It only suggests that some partisan practices should be changed and that parties should be reformed. In short, the aforementioned four reasons for taking political parties out of politics are actually four challenges that modern political parties face, and they are also the opportunities for parties to reform themselves and to perform traditional functions better. Political parties will remain major players in modern democracies because political parties are still the most efficient and effective organizational means for politically ambitious people to win power. 2. Which Parties Are Beneficial to Democratic Consolidation and Proper Functioning of Democracy, and Which Are Not? The consolidation of democracy is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimatised among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. When democracy is consolidated, it has been accepted by most citizens as the only game in town. The consolidation of democracy involves behavioral and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty. This normalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training, the functioning of a mature civil society and more importantly, political institutionalization. Consolidation requires that habituation to the norms and procedures of democratic conflict regulation be developed. A high degree of institutional routinization is key to such a process. The principal indicator of democratic consolidation is the percentage of voters who consider democracy as an indispensable way of life. Russia certainly does not fare well in this regard. In a 1994 survey, when asked how they evaluate the communist regime and the current regime, fifty one percent of the sample gave the communist regime a positive appraisal. Forty eight percent viewed the current regime negatively. In a recent survey, forty four percent agreed that Russia does not need parliament and elections, but instead a strong leader who can make decisions and put them into effect quickly. Fifty four percent supported the argument that experts, not parliament or government, should make the most important economic decisions. Putin's easy win and his lackluster campaign in the latest presidential election also show how much Russians prefer to put a strongman into power. As for the performance of democracy, the quality of democracy can be observed in the following areas: protection of human rights, defense of justice and equality, responsiveness and effectiveness of governance, and nonviolent political expression. Russia has done poorly in these areas. In a 1994 survey, when Russians were asked to compare the communist regime and the current system in eight areas of social life -- freedom in choosing religions, freedom to join any organization one wants, the right to say any thing one wants to say, the freedom to take an interest in politics, the freedom to travel or live anywhere one wants to, fear of illegal arrest, the expectation that government treats everyone equally, and the respondent's sense that people like themselves can influence the government -- over half of the respondents favored the current system in the first four areas and felt that conditions had not changed much in the latter four areas. When over half of the citizens consider the system no better than the communist regime, when there is no serious improvement in protecting freedom and political equality, and when the government can hardly collect taxes from its citizens, it is difficult to say that democracy has consolidated in that country. Unfortunately, Russia is the case. Now the question is, what might explain the failure of Russia's democratic consolidation? It is easy to pick a number of candidates: the short period of change, the lack of a history of democracy, and the mercurial ex-president Yeltsin. I would add the weak, fractured and uninstitutionalized political parties as one of the principal reasons. In Russia, the weak, fractured and uninstitutionalized party system undermines the performance of democracy in several ways. First, the fractured party system means that no party can consistently obtain electoral majorities or near majorities. In the 1995 Duma election, when forty-three parties competed for votes, the biggest party, the Communist Party, won only 22.3 percent of the votes; the second largest party, the Liberal Democrats, won 11.2 percent of the votes. The third party, Our Home is Russia, and the fourth party, Yabloko, won 10.1 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively. In the 1999 Duma election, the Community Party garnered 24.2 percent of the votes, the Unity Party collected 23.4 percent, Fatherland-Russia won 12.6 percent, the Union of Right-wing Forces got 8.7 percent while Yabloko and the Zhirinovsky bloc picked up 6.1 percent. Almost all parties are very narrowly based, which makes it difficult for them to resist narrow class or sectoral interests. The situation is even worse because the party system is fractured and individual parties are so financially weak that they are easily manipulated by oligarchies and completely lose the function of aggregating and mobilizing the popular base. Second, an uninstitutionalized party system means that parties have shallow roots in society. One indicator of party's roots in society is the percentage of voters who trust parties, have a party preference, or identify with a party. On a scale of 1 (no trust) to 7 (full trust), only two percent believe that parties can be trusted. Sixty percent chose 1 to 2 on the scale. Only twenty two percent of the respondents identify with a party, while in advanced democracies, at least sixty to seventy percent of the voters identify with a party. The shallow roots of parties harm democracy in at least two ways. First, the low rate of party identification among voters leads to high electoral volatility. Some parties could garner a large number of votes in one election but might lose most of them in the next. In the four post-Soviet elections, the change rate was 35.3 percent while in advanced democracies, the change rate is 9.7 percent. Comparing the results of the 1999 Duma election with those of the 1995 Duma election, we can see how volatile the Russian politics is. In the 1995 Duma election, Our Home Is Russia won 66 seats while it got only 7 seats in 1999; Yabloko got 46 seats in 1995 while in 1999 it only won 22; the Unity Party got 76 seats in 1999 even though it was formed two months before the election and the Union of Right-Wing Forces which was formed four months before the election won 63 seats. The high volatility makes the system, especially the party system, very opaque to citizens. Moreover, the volatility makes it difficult for citizens to understand on where different contenders stand or develop some party identification. This situation will only lead to unrepresentative government and major policy instability. Second, in an uninstitutionalized party system, voters vote according to personal perceptions or connections instead of party lines. Thus, shallow roots of political parties give more chances to nonpartisan candidates to win elections, especially the presidential elections. The votes Yeltsin and Lebed received in the 1996 presidential election and the recent victory of Putin, who is not affiliated with any party, demonstrate how nonpartisan candidates can win presidential elections. We see similar situations in other elections. In the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections, half of the single-member-district candidates for the lower chamber had no party affiliation, and only 83 of the 218 deputies elected in these races belonged to some party. In 1995, more than 1,000 of the 2,700 candidates for the single-member-district seats were independent. Independents won 78 of the 225 single-member-district seats. The largest single party could muster only 58 seats in the 1995 election and 45 seats in the 1999 election. And because candidates in inchoate systems mainly rely on direct links with the masses, they are more attached to publicity than long-term policy impact. Populism and anti-politics are more common in countries with weakly institutionalized parties. In addition, the mechanism of democratic accountability is weaker and political leaders are more likely to be erratic and to violate unspoken rules of the game in an uninstitutionalized party system. In more institutionalized systems, party labels are powerful symbols, and party commitments are important. Party labels and programs give citizens a way to understand who is who in politics without the need to read all the fine print, and this facilitates accountability. Third, uninstitutionalized parties have a low level of organization. As a consequence, in inchoate systems, political parties are easily dictated by a few party leaders, and the fortune of parties also heavily relies on individual party leaders. Individual leaders' rating and popularity can determine the fate of the party. The surprising victory of the Unity party in the 1999 Duma election is a good example in this regard. The Unity Party is a party established by the Kremlin in October 1999 and it has no organization or program. Because of the endorsement of Putin who became popular in Russia for his toughness in the matter of Chechnya, however, the Unity Party won 23.4 percent of the votes. In an inchoate party system, parties are more or less personified, which makes it difficult to foster organizational loyalty. In Russia, between the December 1993 parliamentary election and the October 1995 election, 128 of 450 Duma members switched parties. The major consequence is that it becomes difficult for parties to be consolidated and stabilized. Without consolidated and stable parties, voters cannot be effectively represented, organized or mobilized, political participation cannot be structured, and the weak and mercurial parties cannot be expected to fulfill the functions of monitoring and checking government leaders. To sum up, Russia's political parties are basically fractured and uninstitutionalized and have failed to aggregate social interests, represent specific constituencies, structure votes during elections, and serve as intermediaries between state and society. 3. Explaining the Underdevelopment of Russia's Political Parties There are many possible reasons for the underdevelopment of Russia's political parties. First, there is only a very short history of democracy in Russia. Russia's democracy has a history of nine years. Russians still distrust their parties and there are still many people who do not identify with any party. Most parties in Russia are under the control of a few celebrities or manipulated by powerful industrial groups. After nine years, there has been no serious change to the parties' relations with society. If we compare the performance of political parties in Russia with that in Taiwan that opened its political system only thirteen years ago, however, we can hardly say that a short history is a sufficient explanation for the poor performance of parties. Here I propose two variables to explain the underdevelopment of the Russian political parties: the revolutionary nature of Russia's democratization and the timing of the first series of elections in Russia. When political changes are revolutionary, they are so sudden that there is not much time for the political elite to organize parties. In addition, revolutionary changes also put some celebrities in the spotlight and turn them into the symbols of political changes. The consequence of this situation is twofold. First, it gives the celebrities fewer incentives to organize parties. Fame and popularity can be the most important resource, which suffices to get them elected as presidents or members of parliament. For instance, Yeltsin never thought of forming a party in 1991 when his popularity reached its high point. Second, the behavior of famous political figures sets an example for other elites with political ambitions. For the less famous elite, individual stunts are more important than organizing voters. The flourishing media, seeking outspoken people and bold moves, also provide the elite with ample opportunities to focus on their own marketable moves instead of organizations. Now, how many parties do we know in Russia? Few. But we do know Yeltsin, Yavlinsky, Gaidar, Zhrinovsky and Putin. The other variable that can help explain the status of Russia's political parties is the timing of the first elections, which is also related to the revolutionary nature of Russia's democratization. Usually, when a political change is radical and when radical forces get the upper hand, the fear that the incumbent might play tricks and anxiety for a share of power motivate opposition forces to demand a quick election. What happened in Indonesia in 1998 is a good example. As such, the election is usually held before parties have a chance to get organized and have some roots. Without party identification or organization as supporting resources, political elites have to rely on themselves to create individual identities. Hence, individual stunts are emphasized. Furthermore, the quick election also makes it impossible to draft appropriate election laws to shape the political party system and force the political elites to base their power in political parties instead of government positions or individual fame. The fact that Yavlinsky and Gaidar formed parties only after the 1993 election means that Russia missed a major opportunity for developing political parties as a result of the quick elections. In conclusion, a lesson we can draw from Russia is that a fractured and uninstitutionalized political party system serves the consolidation of Russia's democracy poorly. To avoid this problem, the political elite need on the one hand to spend more time and efforts organizing parties and making the parties grow at the grassroots level. On the other hand, the political elites should be careful about initiating revolutionary changes. (The author is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Yale University.) |