Straight
Talk About the Estate and Gift Tax: Politics, Economics, and
Morality (Part II)
Dennis
J. VENTRY, Jr.
Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 3
(Editor's
Note: This is the second part of a two-part essay. Part I
was published in the October, 2000 issue of the "Perspectives."
Notes and references of this essay, omitted here due to space
limitation, are available from the author at dventry@brook.edu.)
In the
first part of this article, we examined the political and
economic cases against transfer taxes in the United States.
I argued that the political rhetoric surrounding the effort
to repeal the estate and gift tax-particularly the charge
that it destroys family farms and closely-held businesses-is,
at best, misleading, and at worst, disingenuous. I demonstrated
that the estate and gift tax does not necessarily threaten
aggregate saving, labor supply, or economic growth as its
critics maintain. Nor does it generate an insignificant amount
of revenue, produce prohibitive compliance costs, primarily
tax wealth that has already been taxed, or have little effect
on the rate of charitable contributions, again, all of which
critics maintain.
In the
second part of this discussion, I challenge the assertion
that transfer taxes are immoral because they prevent parents
from passing along hard-earned wealth to children, and because
they tax saving not consumption. The fact that we care about
our children does not make transfer taxes immoral, anymore
than the fact that we care about what we consume makes consumption
taxes immoral. More fundamentally, I challenge the moral case
against taxing wealth at death by invoking history. Americans
have long considered wealth a civic right, not a birthright;
thus, taxing inherited wealth fulfills a moral obligation
in a liberal, democratic society.
The Moral
Case for the Estate and Gift Tax
Many
of the individuals who argue against inheritance taxes on
moral grounds operate from the basis that taxation is fundamentally
a moral issue. I agree. Tax policymaking in the United States
has historically involved both social and economic factors.
From the founding of the country, Americans have used the
tax system to regulate economic privilege, and to restore
equitable income and wealth distributions. Tax justice "American-style"
has measured relative societal burdens against relative societal
benefits, and it has reflected prevailing notions of social
and economic justice. Since World War II, tax policymakers,
particularly economists, have ceded the social justice and
distributive aspects of taxation to legal theorists and philosophers.
Despite this worrisome trend, tax issues still involve moral
and normative considerations.
However
right these individuals are to emphasize the moral underpinnings
of taxation, they are wrong to attack the estate and gift
tax as immoral. Their argument goes something like this. Inheritance
taxes add to the pains and sufferings of grieving heirs. It
penalizes frugal savers. It discourages successful individuals
and families from passing along hard-earned wealth to their
children. And it encourages Americans to "die broke."
Implicit
(and sometimes explicit) in the argument is the objection
that inheritance taxes fall on savers not spenders. Abolishing
the estate and gift tax, it is said, would be morally right
to do assuming that a liberal, democratic society should care
about enhancing future generations, and removing inequitable
consumption patterns.
This
conclusion is simply untenable. First, the fact that we care
about our children does not make estate taxation immoral,
anymore than the fact that we care about what we consume makes
consumption taxes immoral. Or as law professor Richard Schmalbeck
suggests, "There is nothing immoral in consuming food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and education for the benefit
of oneself and one's family." We may consider excessive
consumption immoral, but that consideration is merely a matter
of taste. One person's excessive consumption is another person's
level of subsistence. The presumption that consumption is
morally bankrupt is itself a morally ambiguous.
Second,
the estate and gift tax is hardly immoral from the standpoint
that it subverts the values of a liberal, democratic state.
On the contrary, it reinforces the philosophical foundations
of the very first liberal, democratic state, the United States.
As historians and political philosophers have shown, the founding
fathers worried that political equality would conflict with
individual liberty. They reconciled this tension through the
familiar concept of "republicanism," which upheld
the ideal of civic virtue. Republicanism, with its emphasis
on communal responsibilities, mitigated excessive economic
liberties as well as the "tyranny of the majority."
That is, republicanism struck a balance between the right
to property (or Lockean liberalism) and democratic ideals
of equality.
With
regard to taxation, this compromise resulted in a tax system
that taxed wealthy individuals despite a national aversion
to infringements on individual liberty. The state protected
individuals who pursued personal wealth and property through
labor and reason. But the state prevented individuals from
asserting entitlement through birth. That is, it tolerated
persons who created wealth, but not those who inherited it;
the latter reflected the distinguishing characteristic of
an aristocratic society.
In this
spirit, Congress created a federal wealth transfer tax in
1797 to help pay for American naval buildup against France,
with whom the nascent United States was at war. The new tax
was levied on receipts for legacies and probates for wills.
Congress abolished the tax in 1802, but continued to search
for alternative ways to use taxation to represent republican
ideals.
Early
federal and state legislators employed taxation to restrict
privileges (by taxing corporate charters, for example), and
to "affirm communal responsibilities, deepen citizenship,
and demonstrate the fiscal virtues of a republican citizenry."
The emphasis on communal responsibilities created a unique
form of ability-to-pay taxation that was hostile to excess
accumulation. The U.S. constitution restricted the federal
government from levying direct, non-uniform taxes (except
in proportion to state populations) thereby limiting its ability
to promote more distributive forms of taxation. States, however,
faced no such restriction, and actively used the tax system
to prevent aristocratic concentrations of wealth. State governments
taxed property at a flat, ad valorem rate, for example, believing
that high-income individuals spent a larger share of their
income on land and property than low-income persons. Throughout
the first half of the nineteenth century, states expanded
their use of the general property tax to include both tangible
property (land, equipment, household goods) and intangible
property (cash, credits, stocks, mortgages). By including
intangible property, states increased the percentage of taxes
paid by wealthy citizens, and raised these citizens' aggregate
contribution to both the community and the government. Several
states even experimented with income taxes prior to the Civil
War "with the avowed purpose of removing inequalities
in the tax system," and increasing further the civic
role of its wealthy residents.
In this
historical context, wealthy individuals owed a debt to society.
Their success depended on the ability of the society in which
they lived to sustain economic and political order. Certainly,
these individuals created wealth. But they also benefited
from the system in which they operated. These obligations
were not lost on subsequent generations. At the end of the
nineteenth century, Populists and Progressives aggressively
advocated a progressive federal income tax on the grounds
that it would reach what they perceived to be inequitable
concentrations of economic power. In 1906, President Theodore
Roosevelt, while arguing for a graduated inheritance tax and
a progressive income tax, stated, "The man of great wealth
owes a peculiar obligation to the State, because he derives
special advantages from the mere existence of government."
And in 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt proposed capping
after-tax incomes at $25,000.
Perhaps
these words and proposals seem strangely divorced from our
own time, aberrations from a more idealistic era. But the
fundamental moral imperatives they represent still resonate.
The ideal of a virtuous citizenry, animated by civic duty,
remains at the heart of American political culture. We tolerate
deviations from this norm, to be sure, but only because they
are checked by countervailing forces of equal opportunity.
Abolishing the estate and gift tax could jeopardize the delicate
balance between individual liberty on the one hand and equality
of opportunity on the other. Indeed, as Leon Botstein argues,
"[I]f inheritance taxes are eliminated, the historic
and unique character of American society and culture will
be placed in jeopardy." Worse, according to Botstein,
it could instigate social unrest. Abolishing the estate and
gift tax "after decades marked by the unparalleled accumulation
in wealth and a widening gap between the poor and the rich,
might trigger an unwillingness by Americans to continue to
accept equality of opportunity as a surrogate for actual material
equality."
Regardless
whether one subscribes to Botstein's prediction, the moral
foundation of inheritance taxes cannot be denied. Repealing
the estate and gift tax would confer advantages on individuals
"who may not have demonstrated any other skill than that
of choosing affluent parents." Moreover, it would distort
long-standing notions of fairness, equal opportunity and communal
responsibility. Most important, it would subvert American
democracy and its historical rejection of aristocratic wealth
accumulation.
Conclusion:
Reform, Not Repeal
This
two-part study has defended the estate and gift tax on political,
economic, and moral grounds. In conclusion, however, it recognizes
areas for improvement as well.
Raising
the effective exemption, for one, would make it impossible
for critics to claim that transfer taxes threaten the future
of family farms and businesses in America. Moreover, removing
the "lesser" rich from the estate-tax rolls would
simultaneously remove the critics' poster children. "Without
small businesses and farmers in the mix," economist Martin
Sullivan has argued, "the momentum the Republicans now
have on estate taxes would stall. And their efforts to repeal
the estate tax would crash."
Raising
the exemption would not be hard. In fact, it is scheduled
to increase steadily over the next few years, from $675,000
per person in 2000-2001 to $1,000,000 in 2006 and thereafter.
Moreover, Congress recently demonstrated a willingness to
accelerate raising the cap on exemption levels. Throughout
the last legislative session, various Congressional members
from both parties proposed legislation designed to increase
the effective exemption over the next few years between $2.5
million and $10 million. In addition, the Democratic House
substitute to H.R. 8 would have immediately increased the
$1.3 million exclusion for farms and closely-held businesses
to an effective $4 million exclusion per family; and the Democratic
Senate substitute (in addition to the House changes) would
have immediately raised the exemption for all individuals
to $2 million, and for all married couples to $4 million.
Most recently, the Democratic "Blue Dog" coalition
proposed immediately doubling the exemption, and then raising
it to $4 million over several years.
Increasing
the exemption would also make good policy. First, it would
more accurately reflect American society's rapidly changing
perception of wealth. Specifically, it would accommodate higher
modern thresholds concerning what is and what is not excessive
wealth accumulation. One plausible explanation for why so
many Americans favor repealing the estate and gift tax, despite
the fact that less than two percent of estates pay inheritance
taxes, is that "attitudes about wealth are clearly changing
as more Americans either experience it, or hope to do so in
the future." That is, not only do more Americans feel
that it is okay to be wealthy, they also believe in the dream
of achieving wealth. The estate and gift tax threatens that
dream. But raising the effective exemption would remove the
threat.
Meaningful
reform of the estate and gift tax would involve more than
increasing the exemption levels. It would also improve horizontal
equity by broadening the tax base, removing distortions, and
lowering marginal rates. Some of the most obvious reforms
include eliminating valuation discounts on passively held
assets, abusive trust devices, and tax-motivated expatriation.
The tax could be simplified further by abolishing the complicated
family-owned business interest qualification requirements,
and by removing abnormalities in the rate structure caused
by phase-outs. In addition, any changes to exemption levels
should be indexed for inflation. More nuanced reform could
complement the effort to prevent family enterprises from experiencing
harsh estate tax obligations by, for example, increasing the
number of partners in firms, for the purpose of qualifying
as an interest in a closely-held business that would be eligible
for deferral and installment payment of the estate tax.
All of
these reforms could be implemented without damaging the progressivity
of the estate and gift tax. In fact, raising the exemption
levels would increase the progressivity of the tax, an arguably
laudable policy goal during the prevailing decades-long trend
toward greater income and wealth inequalities. In 1997, 5.4
percent of taxable estates reported gross estate values of
over $5 million. These estates comprised 43 percent of total
gross estate and over half of all transfer tax revenues. Raising
the exemption to $5 million would make the estate and gift
tax more sharply progressive while still generating significant
amount of revenues. As important, it would reflect the tax's
original moral purpose of limiting concentrations of inherited
wealth.
Critics
believe that the estate and gift tax is already too progressive.
When referring to the U.S. transfer tax, editors at The Economist
recently opined, "'Soaking the rich' is not a principle
of good taxation." Indeed, not. But determining whether
the present estate and gift tax-or even a reformed estate
and gift tax-can be considered representative of "soak-the-rich"
taxation is open for debate. It is both an economic and a
moral question. So, too, is it a political question. Some
researchers might prefer to leave these issues to empiricists
in the interest of facilitating "objectivity" and
"scientific rigor." But as we have seen, the debate
over the estate and gift tax involves normative considerations
that do not lend themselves exclusively to scientific inquiry.
Rather, they require analytical, theoretical, and political
inputs. The fate of transfer taxes in the United States will
be decided in the political arena. Economics will certainly
inform the debate. But so will political grandstanding, rhetorical
slights of hand, and moral philosophizing.
Participants
in the next round of debate over the future of the estate
and gift tax will serve an educative role. And they will have
to account for inputs other than their own if they wish to
successfully defend their position. In July, at the height
of Congressional squabbles over the estate and gift tax, the
editors at Commonweal argued, "repealing the estate and
gift tax is an idea that should be resisted on political,
fiscal, and moral grounds." The debate is multi-faceted.
To be heard will require an understanding of not just the
revenue or behavioral effects of inheritance taxes, but also
their political, social, and moral ramifications.
Those
of us who wish to preserve the letter as well as the spirit
of transfer-tax law have some ground to make up. Whether through
empirical research, surveys of the literature, opinion pieces,
Congressional testimony, policy briefs, or radio appearances,
proponents have an obligation to clarify the misrepresentations
that surround the estate and gift tax. Only through education
will the debate move forward, characterized by reality instead
of rhetoric. Indeed, only through education will all Americans-experts,
average citizens, and elected officials-feel compelled to
participate in the discussion over the future of transfer
taxes, and thus, over the meaning of citizenship in a modern
democratic state.
(Dennis
J. Ventry, Jr. is a Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution
in Washington, D.C., and a Ph.D. Candidate in Economic History
at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is the
co-editor (with Joseph J. Thorndike) of Tax Justice for the
21st Century: Reconsidering the Moral and Ethical Bases of
Taxation (Urban Institute Press, forthcoming). Mr. Ventry
wishes to thank Junfu Zhang for his editorial leadership.
Comments are welcome at dventry@brook.edu.)